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### Plan

#### The United States federal government ought to include the United Mexican States in the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

### Contention 1 - Mexican Manufacturing

#### TTIP agreement talks between the US and EU are coming

EC 7/12/13 – (“EU and US conclude first round of TTIP negotiations in Washington”, European Commission, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=941)//javi

The first week-long round of talks for an EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) comes to a closure today in Washington. “It’s been a very productive week”, said EU Chief Negotiator Ignacio Garcia-Bercero coming out of the talks. “We have been striving already for many months to prepare the ground for an ambitious trade and investment deal that will boost the transatlantic economy, delivering jobs and growth for both European and Americans. This week we have been able to take this negotiation to the next step. The main objective has been met: we had a substantive round of talks on the full range of topics that we intend to cover in this agreement. This paves the way to for a good second round of negotiations in Brussels in October.” Working throughout the week, the negotiating groups have set out respective approaches and ambitions in as much as twenty various areas that the TTIP - the biggest bilateral trade and investment negotiation ever undertaken - is set to cover. They included: market access for agricultural and industrial goods, government procurement, investment, energy and raw materials, regulatory issues, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable development, small- and medium-sized enterprises, dispute settlement, competition, customs/trade facilitation, and state-owned enterprises. Negotiators identified certain areas of convergence across various components of the negotiation and - in areas of divergence – begun to explore possibilities to bridge the gaps. The talks have been based on a thorough review of the stakeholders views expressed to date. The negotiators met also in the middle of the week with approximately 350 stakeholders from academia, trade unions, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations to listen to formal presentations and answer questions related to the proposed agreement.

#### US should invite Mexico to EU-US partnership

Siekierski 3/15/13 – (BJ, “Is Mexico looking for NAFTA-EU trade talks?”, iPolitics, <http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/03/15/is-mexico-looking-for-nafta-eu-trade-talks/>)//javi

“It seems really logical to us that this be a trilateral negotiation and that Mexico join,” Minister Guajardo was quoted as saying, in Spanish, by a prominent Mexican business newspaper, El Financiero, Wednesday. Though Mexico already has an agreement with the European Union — which came into force in 2000 — the El Financiero article says Mexican and European authorities have agreed to strengthen it. Rather than negotiate simultaneously with the Americans, therefore, the idea would be to bring both negotiations under one roof. And since Canada is a fellow NAFTA partner, common sense would dictate Canadian involvement as well. With the EU and U.S. aiming to begin their Transatlantic talks in June, Guajardo indicated that Mexico would be “formally petitioning” the EU President and Barack Obama to make it a NAFTA-EU negotiation, El Financiero reported.

#### Mexico needs to be included – expands trade and development of common standards

Negroponte 5/2/13 – Diana Negroponte is a nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative under Foreign Policy at Brookings. She focuses on Latin America and researches and writes about the New Left, populism and the relationship between criminal gangs and state institutions. Negroponte is editor of The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global Competition Ph.D., Georgetown University J.D., American University B.S. Econ, London School of Economics & Political Science (Diana Villiers, “Obama’s Mexico Trip: Putting Trade and Investment at the Top of the Agenda”, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/02-obama-mexico-trip-trade-investment-negroponte)//javi

Investment flows are also mutually beneficial. According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, sales of services in Mexico by majority U.S. owned affiliates were $34.4 billion in 2010. Sales of services in the United States by majority Mexico-owned firms were $4.8 billion. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, the United States currently provides 41 percent of all foreign direct investment in Mexico, benefiting more than 21,139 companies. Beyond the numbers, the reality of trade and investment is that the United States and Mexico compete together in the global economy. Production and supply chains in North America are deeply integrated with the U.S. content of Mexico exports to the United States estimated at 40 cents on the dollar. This compares to 25 cents for Canadian exports to the United States and 4 cents for China and 2 cents for the European Union, according to a Wilson Center report. In short, there exists a growing integrated manufacturing platform that takes advantage of geography, time zones and cultural affinity. The challenge ahead is how to build on that integration for the forthcoming Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment talks with the European Union. The development of common standards and regulations will impact both Mexican and Canadian industry. Therefore, they need to be either at the table, or close to the negotiations. How close will the consultations with the Mexican trade delegation be? Ideally, the Mexicans would like to be at the negotiating table, but that is improbable. More likely is a commitment from President Obama to consult closely with the Mexican delegation. This could include both pre-talks and post-talk briefings, reinforcing Obama’s call “to maintain the economic dialogue over a long period of time.” On the European side, Turkey wishes to have a close consultative arrangement with the EU negotiators. This creates a balanced need for consultations with immediate trading partners.

#### Trade declines if Mexico is not included

Felbermayr et. al. 13 – (“Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Who benefits from a free trade deal?”, GED, http://www.ged-shorts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Study-TTIP\_final\_ENG.pdf)//javi

Table 7 examines the changes in trade in North America and between the USA and the BRICS. A few important insights are striking. First, TTIP leads to trade diversion effects within the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between USA, Mexico and Canada. In the comprehensive liberalization scenario, both exports and imports decline for NAFTA partner countries within the region. The two NAFTA countries whose position is not improved by TTIP, Mexico and Canada, intensify their trade. That is an impressive example of trade diversion effects between countries not directly affected in anyway by TTIP: The access of these countries especially to the US market becomes less attractive due to increased competition from the EU, leading to a substantial rise in trade between them. What makes this effect so strong is that the trade barriers, as we know, between Mexico and Canada have already been eliminated. Interestingly, TTIP leads to an expansion of trade between the EU and Canada. Geographic circumstances are decisive for this result. Because of its closeness to the USA, Canada is especially affected by trade diversion effects involving the USA. This effect leads to creating trade with the EU countries that are geographically farther away, so that transport costs are lower, and the change in the relative cost structures leads to replacement of the American market with the EU. This circumstance means that finalization of an agreement between the EU and Canada, currently under negotiation, would strengthen the trade of the countries involved with each other but not eliminate the negative trade diversion effects.

#### Exclusion of Mexico hurts trade partnership

BFNA 6/17/13 – (“US, EU Benefit Significantly From TTIP”, Bertelsmann Foundation, http://www.bfna.org/article/us-eu-benefit-significantly-from-ttip)//javi

WASHINGTON, DC/GUETERSLOH, GERMANY (June 17, 2013) - The US and all EU member countries would benefit significantly from a comprehensive trade pact, according to "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Who benefits from a free trade deal?", an ifo Institute study commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation. A TTIP that eliminates non-tariff trade barriers and tariffs would boost per capita GDP and employment on both sides of the Atlantic but impose losses on much of the rest of the world. The US would achieve the greatest growth from a TTIP, with long-term per capita GDP climbing 13.4 percent. EU member states would, on average, see five-percent growth in long-term per capita GDP. The United Kingdom would be Europe’s biggest beneficiary; its long-term per capita GDP would rise 9.7 percent. Other EU member countries that would profit more than average from a far-reaching liberalization of trade include small export-oriented economies, such as those of the Baltic states, and crisis-ridden southern European countries. The large economies of Germany and France would benefit less than the EU average from a comprehensive free-trade agreement. Long-term German per capita GDP would increase 4.7 percent; the comparative French figure is 2.6 percent. Intensified trade relations between the US and the EU would decrease their imports from the rest of the world. As a result, long-term per capital GDP would drop 9.5 percent in Canada and 7.2 percent in Mexico. Japan would also see a fall, of 5.9 percent. Additional losers would include developing countries, especially those in Africa and central Asia.

#### US-Mexico trade key to resolve Mexican instability and manufacturing sector

O’Neill 3/18/13 – (Shannon, “Mexico and the United States are linked closer than ever through trade”, Voxxi, http://www.voxxi.com/mexico-united-states-linked-trade/)//javi

When it comes to Mexico, people usually think about the security issue, and that’s what much of the news coverage has been. But underneath that, behind the headlines, we have seen a transformation of Mexico’s economy over the last couple of decades: It has moved from a very closed, inward-looking economy, one whose exports were dominated by oil, to an economy that is one of the most open and increasingly competitive in the world. In measures like trade to GDP, Mexico outpaces not just the United States or places like Brazil, but it outpaces China. It is quite an open and competitive economy now. A big part of that is due to its deepening ties to the United States. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) was signed almost 20 years ago, we have seen the creation of regional supply chains for a myriad of different types of industries and companies. For every product that is imported from Mexico in the US, on average 40 percent of it would actually have been made in the U.S. It has become a very symbiotic relationship, and it has become an integrated economy in many ways and in many sectors, particularly in manufacturing. There, we see almost seamless integration in some companies, where production happens on both sides of the border. What it means is these economies, companies and industries are now not only intimately tied, but permanently tied at this point. Mexico’s positive future tied to the United States Mexico’s positive future is closely tied to the United States, in part because of this integration of production. If it does extend beyond the United States, it would most likely be through an expansion of what is already this North American production platform, through agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would expand Nafta beyond Canada and Mexico, to include other Latin American countries and many Asia Pacific countries. It is quite a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, and one could see it expanding in production chains in many other countries that are participants, and sales would be going up. The U.S., for all of its hiccups in recent years, is still the largest market in the world, so being tied to the U.S. is not a bad thing at all. Recently, talk about a mega-agreement on trade between the world’s biggest trading bloc—the European Union—and the United States has surfaced. But it is not clear at all that this would hurt Mexico; it already has its own trade agreement with the EU and, on the other hand, there may be incentives to extend the EU-U.S. trade agreement to include other countries.

#### US is an integral part of Mexican manufacturing industry

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### US free trade is key to Mexican manufacturing and aerospace

Ryder 10 – (“Mexico Takes Flight”, Inbound Logistics, June 2010, http://www.ryder.com/en/supply-chain/solutions-by-industry/~/media/Ryder/Files/KnowledgeCenter/WhitePapers/RSC345Mexico%20Takes%20FlightIBLLowResEprintsingle.pdf)//javi

Among the many attractions that draw aerospace companies to Mexico, the cost of labor is a major factor. Highly skilled workers in Mexico’s aerospace industry earn from $5.80 to $7.80 an hour. Mexico is the lowest-cost choice for U.S. companies that outsource manufacturing abroad, surpassing India, China, and Vietnam, according to a report released this year by AlixPartners. Companies can easily ship products and components to Mexico from their plants in the United States or Canada for final assembly, or ship finished products to customers throughout North America. “You’re talking hours and days, rather than weeks, for transit to the United States,” says Jim Moore, vice president of sales for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “You can ship on Thursday morning by truck and deliver on Monday.” Having targeted aerospace as a strategic growth industry, the Mexican government is doing its best to make the country an attractive environment for this sector. One of the most important incentives is the maquila system, which has prompted many North American manufacturers, in a variety of industries, to “nearshore” their production in Mexico. Maquilas are factories that operate in free trade zones. Companies import materials and equipment to those locations without paying taxes or duties, then reexport the finished products. Often, the manufactured goods are components that are shipped to factories outside Mexico for final assembly in products such as aircraft, automobiles, and computers. But even outside the maquila zones, parts and materials for use in aerospace manufacturing enjoy special tariff treatment, entering the country duty-free, says Ricardo Alvarez, director of business development for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “Also, the value-added tax (VAT) is refundable after five days of the import process,” he notes. Mexico’s federal and state governments have established a variety of other tax incentives for the aerospace industry. In fact, from 2006 to 2008–a time when Mexico had eliminated incentives for many manufacturing sectors–it retained its incentives for aerospace. These included capital equipment grants, help with infrastructure, real estate grants, and the establishment of an Aerospace Training Center in Querétaro. FEMIA, an association of 48 aerospace manufacturers operating in Mexico, works with the federal and state governments to promote the interests of the industry. One of FEMIA’s goals is to develop a National Strategic Aerospace Plan.

#### Mexican aerospace is key to US aerospace investments

Taylor 13 (Guy, “Aerospace: An Emerging Mexican Industry”, Americas Quarterly, Winter, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/aerospace-emerging-mexican-industry)

What began as an initial push into Mexico by U.S. manufacturers such as General Electric during the years following the 1994 enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement has now emerged as one of the nation’s most vibrant sectors. With 30,000 Mexicans now employed in aerospace factories across 16 of the nation’s 31 states, Mexican government investment in the sector is also growing—most measurably through the establishment of training schools and new university programs aimed at delivering a future crop of homegrown aerospace workers, plant managers and possibly even designers. The nation graduated more engineers per capita than Germany in 2012. While the states of Querétaro and Baja California make up the majority of aerospace production in Mexico, recent developments in Chihuahua City deserve a closer look. Ford Motor Company opened a factory in 1983 and has since built nearly 7 million truck engines. Thirty-six aerospace parts factories have opened in Chihuahua City over the past five years. A recent reporting trip there revealed that the vast majority of the factories are not Mexican-owned—which makes Mexico’s aerospace market unique in the hemisphere. The downside of this is that the country may be used increasingly for its cheap labor by profit-hungry companies from more established markets. But the upside finds Mexico emerging as a new center of globalization. A variety of international companies have recently opened new plants in Chihuahua City: U.S.-based supplier Nordam, which makes everything from airplane windows to cockpit doors; France-based Manior Aerospace, which cuts shiny precision-shaped steel discs that end up on Boeing commercial jets; and Netherlands-based Fokker Technologies.

#### Aerospace decline causes global instability and great power war

Pfaltzgraff 10 – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9

Deterrence Strategy In stark contrast to the bipolar Cold War nuclear setting, today’s security environment includes multiple, independent nuclear actors. Some of these independent nuclear weapons states are potential adversaries, some are rivals, and some are friends, but the initial decision for action by any one of them may lie beyond U.S. control. The United States may need to influence, signal, and restrain enemies, and it may need to continue to provide security guarantees to non-nuclear friends and allies. America may also face catalytic warfare, where, for example, a U.S. ally such as Israel or a third party such as China could initiate action that might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Although the United States would not be a party to the nuclear escalation decision process, it could be drawn into the conflict. Compared to a bipolar world, very little is known about strategic nuclear interaction and escalation in a multipolar world. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must restrain a wider variety of actors today than during the Cold War. This requires a range of capabilities and the capacity to address specific challenges. The deterrent must provide security guarantees and assurance sufficient to prevent the initiation of catalytic warfare by an ally, while deterring an adversary from resorting to nuclear escalation. America may also need simultaneously to deter more than one other nuclear state. Deterrence requirements include four critical elements: early warning, C2, delivery systems, and weapons. The Air Force plays an indispensable role in furnishing the U.S. early warning system in its entirety through satellites and radar networks. In command and control, infrastructure is provided by the Air Force, including Milstar satellites and, in the future, advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) satellites. In the area of delivery systems and weapons, two-thirds of the strategic triad – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers – is furnished by the Air Force and its Global Strike Command. U.S. Overseas Basing and the Anti-Access/Area-Denial Threat The increased availability of anti-access/area-denial assets coupled with growing threats to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace commons are challenging the power projection capabilities of the United States. These threats, in the form of aircraft and long-range missiles carrying conventional or nuclear munitions, present problems for our overseas bases. States such as North Korea, China, and Iran jeopardize the notion that forward-deployed U.S. forces and bases will be safe from enemy attack. Consequently, the United States must create a more flexible basing structure encompassing a passive and active defense posture that includes these features: dispersal, hardening, increased warning time of attack, and air defenses. Simultaneously, the United States must continue to develop long-range, offensive systems such as low-observable manned and remotely piloted strike aircraft, precision missiles, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to penetrate heavily defended A2/AD environments. This approach will increase the survivability of U.S. forward-deployed assets and power projection capabilities and thus bolster deterrence and U.S. guarantees to America’s allies and friends. Asymmetric Challenges The increasing number of actors gaining access to advanced and dual-use technologies augments the potential for asymmetric attacks against the United States and its allies by those who are unable to match U.S. military capabilities. Those actors pose increasing challenges to the ability of the United States to project power through the global commons. Such attacks could target specific U.S. vulnerabilities, ranging from space assets to the financial, transportation, communications, and/or energy infrastructures, and to the food and water supply, to mention only the most obvious. Asymmetric attacks denying access to critical networks and capabilities may be the most cost-effective approach to circumventing traditional U.S. force advantages. The USAF and DoD must develop systems and technologies that can offset and defend against asymmetric capabilities. This will require a robust R&D program and enhanced USAF cooperation with its sister services and international partners and allies. Space Dominance Space is increasingly a contested domain where U.S. dominance is no longer assured given the growing number of actors in space and the potential for kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, including ASAT weapons, EMP, and jamming. As a result, the United States must protect vital space-based platforms and networks by reducing their vulnerability to attack or disruption and increasing the country’s resilience if an attack does occur. Required steps include hardening and incorporating stealth into next generation space systems and developing rapid replenishment capacity (including micro-satellite technologies and systems and new launch capabilities). At the same time, America must reduce its dependence on space capabilities with air-based substitutes such as high altitude, long endurance, and penetrating ISR platforms. Increased cooperation among the services and with U.S. allies to develop such capabilities will also be paramount. Cyber Security Cyber operations are vital to conducting USAF and joint land, sea, air, and space missions. Given the significance of the cyber threat (private, public, and DoD cyber and information networks are routinely under attack), the United States is attempting to construct a layered and robust capability to detect and mitigate cyber intrusions and attacks. The USAF’s cyber operations must be capable of operating in a contested cyber domain to support vital land, sea, air, and space missions. USAF cyberspace priorities include developing capabilities to protect essential military cyber systems and to speed their recovery if an attack does occur; enhancing the Air Force’s capacity to provide USAF personnel with the resolution of technical questions; and training/recruitment of personnel with cyber skills. In addition, the USAF and DoD need to develop technologies that quickly and precisely attribute attacks in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can spread quickly among networks, making it extremely difficult to attribute their perpetrator, and therefore to develop a deterrence strategy based on retaliation. In addition, some cyber issues are in the legal arena, including questions about civil liberties. It is likely that the trend of increased military support to civil authorities (for example, in disaster relief operations) will develop in the cyber arena as well. These efforts will entail greater service, interagency, international, and private-sector collaboration. Organizational Change and Joint Force Operations To address growing national security challenges and increasing fiscal constraints, and to become more effective, the joint force needs to adapt its organizations and processes to the exigencies of the information age and the security setting of the second decade of the twenty-first century. This entails developing a strategy that places increased emphasis on joint operations in which each service acts in greater concert with the others, leverages capacities across the services (two land services, three naval services, and five air services) without duplicating efforts, and encourages interoperability. This would provide combatant commanders (CCDRs) with a greater range of capabilities, allowing heightened flexibility to use force. A good example of this approach is the Air-Sea Battle concept being developed jointly by the Air Force and Navy, which envisions heightened cooperation between the two services and potentially with allies and coalition partners. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities There is an increasing demand for ISR capabilities able to access and persist in contested airspace in order to track a range of high-value mobile and hard-to-find targets, such as missile launchers and underground bunkers. This increases the need for stealthy, survivable systems and the development of next-generation unmanned platforms. The USAF must continue to emphasize precision targeting, both for strike and close-air-support missions. High-fidelity target identification and discrimination enabled by advanced radars and directed-energy systems, including the ability to find, track, and target individuals within a crowd, will provide battlefield commanders with improved options and new opportunities for leveraging joint assets. Engagement and International Security Cooperation Allies and coalition partners bring important capabilities from which the USAF and other services have long benefited. For example, allies and coalition partners can provide enhanced situational awareness and early warning of impending crises as well as assist in understanding the interests, motivations, traditions, and cultures of potential adversaries and prospective coalition partners. Moreover, foreign partner engagement and outreach are an avenue to influence partner and adversary perspectives, thus shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. national security interests. Engagement also may be a key to realizing another Air Force and joint priority: to sustain or gain access to forward operating bases and logistical infrastructure. This is particularly important given the growing availability of A2/AD assets and their ability to impede U.S. power projection capabilities. Procurement Choices and Affordability The USAF needs to field capabilities to support current operations and pressing missions while at the same time pursuing promising technologies to build the force of the future. Affordability, effectiveness, time urgency, and industrial base issues inevitably shape procurement choices and reform. The Air Force must maintain today’s critical assets while also allocating resources to meet future needs. Given the long lifespan anticipated for many weapon systems, planners need to make the most reliable cost estimates and identify problems at the outset of a weapons system’s development phase so that they can be corrected as early and cost-effectively as possible. Support to Civil Authorities As evidenced in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile (the Chile earthquake hit after this conference), the USAF has a vital role to play in the U.S. response to international relief operations and support to civil authorities. In Haiti, the USAF reopened the airport and deployed contingency response elements, while also providing ISR support for the joint forces in the theater. In Chile, USAF satellite communication capabilities were critical to the recovery and relief efforts. USAF civil support roles are likely to grow to include greater use of the Reserve Components. Consequently, USAF planners should reassess the active and reserve component mix of forces and capabilities to identify potential mobilization and requirement shortfalls. CLOSING CONFERENCE THOUGHTS A recurring conference theme was the need for the USAF to continue to examine specific issues of opportunity and vulnerability more closely. For example, a future initiative could include focused working groups that would examine such questions and issues as: • How can air, space, and cyberspace capabilities best support deterrence, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and support national objectives? • How should the USAF leadership reconceptualize its vision, institutional identity, and force posture to align as closely as possible with the future national security setting? • What is the appropriate balance between high-end and low-end air and space capabilities that will maximize military options for national decision makers, given emerging threats and fiscal constraints? • What are the opportunities, options, and tradeoffs for investment and divestment in science and technology, infrastructure, and programmed capabilities? • What are additional interdependent concepts, similar to Air-Sea Battle, that leverage cross-service investments to identify and foster the development of new joint capabilities? • What are alternative approaches to officer accessions and development to support shifting and emerging Air Force missions, operations, and force structure, including cyber warfare? • How can the USAF best interact with Congress to help preserve or refocus the defense-industrial base as well as to minimize mandates and restrictions that weigh on future Air Force investments? Finally, the USAF must continue to be an organization that views debate, as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force put it in his opening conference address, “…as the whetstone upon which we sharpen our strategic thinking.” This debate must also be used in pursuit of political support and to ensure that the USAF maintains and develops critical capabilities to support U.S. national security priorities. The 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy was conceived as a contribution to that debate. Almost a century has passed since the advent of airpower and Billy Mitchell’s demonstration of its operational potential with the sinking of the Ostfriesland on July 21, 1921. For most of that time, the United States has benefitted from the rapid development of air and space power projection capabilities, and, as a result, it has prevailed in successive conflicts, contributed to war deterrence and crisis management, and provided essential humanitarian relief to allies and friends around the world. As we move into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), like its service counterparts, is re-assessing strategies, operational concepts, and force structure. Across the conflict spectrum, security challenges are evolving, and potential adversaries–state and non-state actors–are developing anti-access and other asymmetric capabilities, and irregular warfare challenges are becoming more prevalent. The potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which state adversaries and/or non-state actors use a mix of conventional and unconventional capabilities against the United States, a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emanate from highly adaptive adversaries who ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority. As it develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts constraints that will have important implications for budget and procurement programs, basic research and development (R&D), and the maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. Control of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the United States and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the United States can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent. General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, the United States faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airman who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment. System Versatility In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity. Space Access and Control Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability. Cyber Capabilities The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector collaboration. Challenges for the Air Force General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included: • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness? • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century? • What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables? • How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments? • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations? • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats? • How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment? • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges? • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests? These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort. The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines major challenges for the United States and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION Technology proliferation is accelerating. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by dual-use technologies and chemical/biological agents. The battlefields of the future are likely to be more lethal as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems and as global and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments. PROLIFERATION TRENDS The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions. First, the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats. Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities. Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets. Fourth, the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing an impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears “designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 These threats include ballistic missiles, aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations. Fifth, the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed non-state actors is a logical projection of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so. Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor. Taken together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales. Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than comprehensive: • A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy • An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists • A Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war • A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula

What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management.

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Mexican economic collapse causes instability

**Barnes 11** – (4/29/11, Joe, Bonner Means Baker Fellow James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, “Oil and U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relations,” <http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-BarnesBilateral-04292011.pdf>)

There is already a short- to medium-term risk of substantial instability in Mexico.  As noted, the country is enduring extremely high levels of drug-related violence.  Even if the Mexican government eventually succeeds in its efforts to suppress this violence, the process is likely to be expensive, bloody, and corrosive in terms of human rights.  A period of feeble economic growth, combined with a fiscal crisis associated with a drop in revenues from Pemex, could create a “perfect storm” south of the border.   If this were to occur, Washington would have no choice but to respond.  In the longer-term, the United States has a clear interest in robust economic growth and fiscal sustainability in Mexico.  There is at least one major example of the U.S. coming to Mexico’s aid in an economic emergency.  In 1994, the United States extended US$20 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico when the peso collapsed, in large part to make U.S. creditors whole.  Not least, a healthy Mexican economy would reduce the flow of illegal immigration to the United States.  To the extent that prospects for such growth and sustainability are enhanced by reform of Pemex, the United States should be supportive.  It might be best, in terms of U.S. economic and commercial interests, were Pemex to be fully privatized, but even partial reforms would be welcome.  Not all national oil companies are created equal: Pemex’s development into something like Norway’s Statol would mark an important improvement.

#### Mexico’s economy is critical to the US – collapse causes decline of US economy and competitiveness

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Mexico has come a long way in the last three decades, shifting from a closed to an open economy, from booms and busts to macroeconomic stability, and from a poor to a middle class nation. But it has yet to unlock its true growth potential, or to match the economic gains and growth rates seen in many of its emerging market peers—China, South Korea, Brazil, and Peru. One might sum up U.S. interest as friendly concern for a neighbor, and it is indeed that. But the U.S. economic future is also increasingly tied to Mexico. A real economic partnership between the two neighbors can be more than just an engine for Mexico’s economic middle; it can help protect and expand America’s middle class. The United States’ economic reliance on Mexico is no less real just because it is overlooked. Already twenty-two of the fifty U.S. states claim Mexico as their first or second destination for exports. Leading the pack are the border states. Each month Texan companies send over US$7 billion and their Californian counterparts almost US$2 billion in goods to their neigh bor.82 But this bonanza isn’t limited just to the border. ‘The economies of states such as South Dakota, Nebraska, and New Hampshire now depend on exports to Mexico as well. U.S. companies in industries as diverse as elec tronic equipment, household appliances, paper products, red meat, pears, and grapes rely today on Mexican industry and consumers for their liveli hoods. Because of these ties, economic expansion to the south will boost growth to the north. The opposite is also true; future downturns in Puebla will mean layoffs in Peoria. This dependence through economic integration with Mexico is only deepening as companies worldwide transform the way they make things. American businesses such as Ford, General Electric, Honeywell, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard have rebounded by “near-shoring” or opening fac tories in nearby Mexico. Less recognized, this has saved many U.S. jobs in the process.83 Studies estimate that roughly 40 percent of Mexican-made products value is actually “made in the U.S.A.”—ten times that of Chinese-made goods.84 In this age of inexorable globalization, U.S. eco nomic cooperation with Mexico holds out the hope—and indeed the promise—of stopping the wholesale decampment of manufacturing firms to trans-Pacific locales. Misunderstood by U.S. politicians and pundits alike, NAFTA, and Mexican outsourcing more generally, can he a good thing for U.S. work ers and the U.S. middle class. With a different mindset and approach, U.S.-Mexico economic ties can help boost America’s chances in the global economic race. Using raw data collected confidentially from thousands of large U.S. multinational manufacturing firms, two Harvard Business School professors, along with a colleague from the University of Michigan, upend the conventional wisdom, finding that as companies ramp up investment and employment abroad they also invest and hire more people at home.8 Companies become more productive—and more competitive—and with their better products, lower prices, and higher sales, they create new jobs all around.86 The study shows that, on average, when a firm hires ten employees abroad, it will actually hire, not lay off at least two employees at home. This means that efforts to stop “oftshoring” might actually have the reverse and perverse effect of undermining U.S. jobs.

#### Global economic decline causes nuclear war

Auslin ‘9

(Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### Contention 2 - EU Relations

#### Negotiations with Mexico are necessary to the success of TTIP

Knigge 2/26/13 – (Michael, “EU-US trade deal is 'unique opportunity'”, DW, http://www.dw.de/eu-us-trade-deal-is-unique-opportunity/a-16584523?maca=en-rss-en-top-1022-rdf)//javi

Experts are skeptical as to whether such an agreement can ever be reached. They point to similar visions of free, transatlantic trade from the past that fizzled out in the political chambers of Washington and Brussels. After the multi-year and ultimately fruitless worldwide trade deal called the Doha Development Agenda failed in 2008, Washington is also tired of endless discussion. In order to gauge the seriousness of Europeans on the matter, the Obama administration has recently been anxious for a clear signal from Brussels. Yet even if the EU and US begin negotiations in the coming months, success is anything but assured. Negotiators from both the US government and the EU Commission will not be free to negotiate as they please. Without the ultimate approval of US Congress and the EU Parliament, there will be no agreement. Other countries, such as Turkey, which has a customs agreement with the EU, or Canada and Mexico, which are linked to US trade through NAFTA, will at the very least have to play an informal role in future negotiations.

#### EU says yes

COG 3/3/08 – (Bob Thiel, “A Combined EU & North American Trade Block Coming?”, Church of God News, http://www.cogwriter.com/news/prophecy/a-combined-eu-north-american-trade-block-coming/)//javi

Fifty-five U.S. Senators and Congressman currently serve as advisors to a “working group” for the Transatlantic Common Market between the U.S. and the European Union. “An economist from the World Bank has argued in print that the formation of the Transatlantic Common Market is designed to follow the blueprint of Jean Monet, a key intellectual architect of the European Union, recognizing that economic integration must inevitably lead to political integration.” The idea of this union came to light in April 2007, when President Bush, German Chancellor Merkel, and European Commission President Barroso launched the Transatlantic Economic Council. Efforts are already underway to create a North American Community, including the U.S., Mexico and Canada. This community is to be based on security and economic issues and is intended to be in place by 2010 (WorldNetDaily.com, July 20, 2005; September 25, 2006). The Transatlantic Common Market is intended to combine the North American Community with the EU, creating the world’s most formidable trade bloc—a trade bloc that would be so large that its trading policies would automatically become policies for the world. Plans for this new “common market” are proceeding and are intended to pass through in a “treaty” form, much like the most recent EU Treaty, in order to avoid the scrutiny and debate that often come with more “formal” agreements (January 16, 2008). Revelation 18 warns of a future Beast, known as Babylon the Great, through which “the merchants of the earth have become rich through the abundance of her luxury” (v. 3). I have been expecting such a development for some time. And today, I would like to explain what I have believed for over 20 years will most likely happen with the above proposed trade block. Negotiations will continue and some type of loose agreements will happen. In the spirit of accommodation and personal interest, many of the “standards” of the European Union will be adopted by the USA, Canada and Mexico, as well as by nearly all of the countries of the world. The Arab nations will most likely agree with many of the standards as they seem to be destined to form a brief end-time alliance with the Europeans (The Arab World In the Bible, History, and Prophecy).

#### TTIP failure hurts US-EU trade ties and relations

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

Yet even if it fails – and there are plenty who think that the obstacles such as agriculture and, most recently, data privacy are insurmountable – a failure would be pivotal, showing that tariffs can be dropped but non-tariff barriers, which are often more cultural in nature, remain stubborn. A failure, says Fredrik Erixon, the director of the European Center for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in Brussels, “could lead to a larger standstill in efforts to address 21st century trade barriers.” Long-standing obstacles Tariffs between the US and EU are already relatively low, but because of the sheer size of trade between the two – representing half of global economic output – advocates say it would be a major booster of growth and jobs, especially in debt-stricken Europe that has seen record high unemployment at 12.2 percent. The two already invest nearly $4 trillion in each other’s economies, according to US statistics, which translates into 7 million jobs. It’s the non-tariff barriers, however, that most are watching in TTIP talks. Today, if a product is made in France, for example, it goes through the various regulatory hurdles to bring it to the marketplace; it then has to go through another set of strenuous – and often redundant – hurdles to reach the US market. Under the TTIP, both sides could agree to mutually recognize the others’ systems. When it comes to car safety, reducing red tape may be an easy compromise. But other issues on the table have long vexed negotiators. That includes French subsidies for its film industry, European resistance to genetically modified foods (GMOs), or data privacy laws – especially in the wake of the information released by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden revealing the US systematically spies on its own citizens, as well as European institutions. “One of the sleeper issues in the deal is how to deal with privacy,” says Bruce Stokes, the director of the Global Economic Attitudes program at the Pew Research Center. Europeans, particularly Germans, are far more sensitive than Americans when it comes to data privacy. “There is a disconnect between Europeans and Americans about this new digital economy,” Mr. Stokes says. And even if the Snowden case is about government, not industry, it bolsters European assumptions that Americans don’t care about privacy, he says. Supporters of the agreement know these talks will be arduous, but at a time of economic weakness, they might have the political will to push forward. “Europe is stuck, and the US is also stuck, although not quite as bad,” says Thomas Wright, a fellow in the Managing Global Order project at the Brookings Institution. “This offers a way that leaders can be proactive and generate growth. I think that resonates with people, particularly in Europe.” Mr. Erixon also says that regulators in specific industries have more of an incentive to find solutions now, because their refusal to compromise would influence every other industry included in the talks. On the issue of the US using chlorine when washing chicken, for example, compromise has been impossible because the context was always too small. “Regulators were trying to defend their position, with no interest at all in participating in negotiations with other countries,” he says. “If you play filibuster now, the cost is higher.” 'Cultural exceptions' – and similarities So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate. “It’s not a little issue. It’s the cultural meat of a nation,” says Josef Braml, transatlantic expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, who has little hope that a deal is attainable – above all, he says, because of the weakness of President Obama. But the “cultural exception” debate could be a harbinger of sentiments that develop as the trade talks get underway. Guillaume Xavier-Bender of the German Marshall Fund of the US in Brussels says that in many ways the talks will show how similar regulations between Europe and the US are. “There are more things in common between Europeans and Americans than there are differences,” he says. But on the politically most sensitive issues, claims that TTIP is merely an American instrument to change European values could be made. “It is possible in Europe you see anti-globalization and anti-liberalization movements evolve into anti-Americanism,” he says. If an agreement becomes impossible to forge, it may ultimately illustrate more than transatlantic differences. Mr. Stokes says that global economies have continuously become more closely integrated over time. But if in the TTIP it’s possible to get rid of tariffs yet not non-tariff barriers, he says it will be telling for the future of trade agreements globally – a sign, he says, that “we may be encountering the edges of the limits of globalization.”

#### Decline in US-EU relations causes Protectionism

C. Fred Bergsten 99, Director, Institute for International Economics, “America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 78 n. 2, March/April 1999, p. 20+, LN.

Both sides now run the risk of drift and even paralysis in transatlantic trade policy -- with potentially severe repercussions for the rest of the world. A slide into protectionism or even a failure to continue opening new markets would have a major impact on the global trading system. Could we then expect Asian economies, who depend on expanded exports to emerge from their deep recessions, to keep their own markets open? Would the transition economies in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia stick to their liberalization strategies? With the backlash against globalization already evident everywhere, the ominous inward-looking protectionist and nationalistic policies that the world has rejected so decisively could reemerge once again. A failure of transatlantic leadership would make such policy reversals particularly likely. The United States and the EU are the only economic superpowers and the only two regions enjoying reasonable economic growth. They created the GATT system and, more recently, the WTO. Despite their own occasional transgressions, they have nurtured and defended the system throughout its evolution over the past 50 years. While Japan has been important on a few issues and the developing countries played an encouraging role in the Uruguay Round, the Atlantic powers built and sustained the world trade order. Their failure to maintain that commitment would devastate the entire regime.

#### Great power war

Panzer 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### US-EU relations prevent Iran prolif

Peterson et Al. **13** [John Peterson - Chair of International Politics at the University of Edinburgh, Riccardo Alcaro - IAI's Transatlantic Programme, Riccardo Alcaro is co-coordinator of the 7th Framework Programme-funded Transworld project on the future of the transatlantic relationship and its role in the world; he is responsible for the organization of the annual Transatlantic Security Symposium on the security priorities debated by the transatlantic partners. He is a fellow of the EU-wide programme European Foreign and Security Policy Studies, and Nathalie Tocci - Senior Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, “MULTIPOLARITY AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: Multilateralism and Leadership in a New International Order”, P. 15-18, Accessed: 9/17/13]

Above all, the NTA has helped the transatlantic relationship keep pace with the emergence of Brussels as a political capital. The Brussels-Washington “channel” in transatlantic relations has gained in importance in past decades over others, including NATO and the various bilateral channels between Washington and national European capitals (including London and Berlin). US officials or commentators concerned with individual policy sectors or areas of the world are exceptions to the rule about American ignorance of the EU. To illustrate, analysts of the politics of Iran’s nuclear programme concede that “[t]he Europeans have been the unsung heroes in pressing Iran with their embargo on the import of Iranian oil” (Middle East Institute 2012). The embargo caused genuine pain to southern EU member states already in serious economic difficulties. But it also ratcheted up the pressure on Teheran – posing genuine economic hardship on Iran – in a way that made the West seem like a collective. On the economic front, trade specialists and economists regularly acknowledge the importance of the Union both as the world’s largest trading power and by far America’s most important economic partner (see Hamilton and Quinlan 2013). Toje (2008: 144) notes that “American decision-makers do take the European Union very seriously in matters of trade and economy.” An exemplary instance was the 2011 NTA summit that yielded an agreement to create a bilateral High Level Working on Jobs and Growth to tackle an ambitious cooperative economic policy agenda. There is sufficient “low-hanging fruit” in the form of economic gains for both sides to justify an ambitious US-EU economic cooperation agreement. Two separate studies suggested that greater gains for the US were available from a US-EU deal than from the Trans-Pacific Partnership it was pursuing in Asia (see Stokes 2013). Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address featured clear investment of political will in the initiative from the highest political level: “tonight I am announcing that we will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union – because trade that is free and fair across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.” Hence, the institutions that bind the West together appear relatively robust. Moreover, new forces in the emerging international order can be interpreted, plausibly, as pushing the US and EU towards each other. One is the rise of China. The Obama administration’s “Asian pivot” signalled a fundamental shift in America’s geopolitical focus towards Asia and away from Europe. Collective transatlantic action on China will inevitably face obstacles as the US and Europe each try to curry favour with China and seek access to its fast-growing markets. But both Washington and European national capitals – not least Brussels – share an interest in encouraging Beijing to settle disputes with other Asian capitals over islands and territory in the region peacefully and, above all, to become a responsible international economic actor. Another change that, on balance, may encourage collective transatlantic action is Russia’s emergence as a “pole.” European reliance on Russian energy supplies makes confrontation a decidedly unappealing option for most EU member states, which are naturally inclined to seek some form of modus vivendi with their difficult neighbour (David et al. 2013). The US has no such concerns and is therefore less restrained in criticizing Moscow for its poor human rights record or signalling that Georgia and Ukraine might become NATO members, as the Bush administration did (recklessly), provoking deep resentment in the Kremlin. Yet, the US has its own interest in engaging Russia in ways that make it a responsible geopolitical player in its near abroad and something like a normal trading power as a WTO member. A perhaps less obvious source of common transatlantic cause is the rise of India. The incentives for the US and Europe jointly to encourage New Delhi to be a help and not a hindrance on all things “AfPak” (Afghanistan and Pakistan) are clear. Only slightly less so is shared motivation to prod India – a country where trade ministers are garlanded when they return home from a WTO summit after scuppering a deal – towards wielding its economic power in ways that are not cynical and self-centred, as well as to develop its way out of its grinding poverty. At the same time, forces exist that strain the West. There is no question that Europe – leaving aside the euro crisis – has slid down the list of American geopolitical priorities. The EU and Europe more generally remain underappreciated allies in Washington. The US Republican party often finds a convenient epithet for Obama’s economic policies by describing them as “European.” Consider Mitt Romney’s contentions that Obama “takes his cues from the Social Democrats of Europe” in turning America into a “European-style welfare state and entitlement society,” or Newt Gingrich’s that the President’s goal was a “European socialist state.” The Eurozone crisis, the intense interpenetration of the US and EU in each other’s economies, and the widespread perception that America’s post-2008 economic recovery was stymied in large part by developments in Europe inevitably led many in Washington to view Europe as more a burden than a strategic partner. A broader question is whether the US and Europe are drifting apart in their views of what constitutes a “good society.” New questions arose during the post-2008 recession about the ability of the American economy to sustain an upwardly mobile middle class amidst rising inequality and stubborn unemployment. With a spiralling, crippling public debt, there was little appetite in either major US party to adopt a more European-style role for the state. Sachs (2012) notes very little difference between Democrats and Republicans in terms of their view of the role of the state: Paul Ryan’s (as Romney’s Vice-Presidential candidate) budgetary proposals called for public budget outlays of 19.7 per cent of GDP in 2016 and 19.5 per cent in 2020. Meanwhile, the Obama administration proposed 19.1 per cent in 2016 and 19.7 per cent in 2020. Total US government revenues (at all levels of government) stand at about 32 per cent of GDP. In the EU, the comparable figure is 44 per cent. Other less tangible but still powerful forces also push towards drift and perhaps even fracture. One is a basic lack of American understanding of how Europe is organized politically. Even thoughtful US scholars such as Kupchan (2012: 153) misinterpret the EU by concluding (for example) that the failure of the Union’s Constitutional Treaty led ‘instead [to] drafting a dramatically scaled-down version known as the Lisbon Treaty’. By any account, Lisbon is mostly identical to the Constitutional Treaty without its constitutional trappings about an EU flag, anthem, and so on. Thinking longer term, it is perhaps more germane to the future of transatlantic relations to think that the real problem will be that European policy – including foreign policy – will become more EU-based in the decades to come while the Union struggles to command legitimacy, attention and understanding in the US. No opinion poll to our knowledge has ever shown that a majority of Americans has even heard of the EU. Meanwhile, recent polling data show that the percentage of Americans who think that Europe is the most important area of the world to the US fell from 50 per cent in 1993 to 37 per cent in 2011. Those judging that Asia was most important rose from 31 per cent to 47 per cent (PEW 2011). Having considered the forces that both push Europe and America together, and those that threaten to pull them apart, we find no conclusive evidence of either partnership or a bipolar West. Yet, on balance, the transition towards a more multipolar order heightens the incentives they confront to make common cause, particular on their bilateral economic agenda but also in managing the rise of emerging powers. We consider below what kind of collective transatlantic action might be possible and to what ends. A leading observer of contemporary IR concedes that the greatest challenge of the next decades is “establishing legitimate authority for concerted international action on behalf of the global community… at a time when old relations of authority are eroding” (Ikenberry 2011: 6). Insofar as a shift towards multipolarity creates a “crisis,” it is one of legitimacy and authority. Ikenberry (2011: 5) resorts to liberal institutionalist logic to insist that it is a crisis “within the old hegemonic organization of liberal order…[it is] not a crisis in the deep principles of the order itself. It is a crisis of governance.” Clearly, the commitment of several of the BRIC countries to “deep liberal principles” and, by extension, an international order for which they provide a foundation is questionable. At the same time, the age’s most pressing international problems – nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, economic stagnation, global warming and so on – demand not only collective governance but also leadership to give it political impulse. Whether or not we accept Ikenberry’s account, the West can secure its leadership status in any future international order only if it provides such an impulse. Inevitably, its leadershipcapacity will atrophy if Europe and America seek to lead using traditional means. In a rapidly changing environment, a “status quo leadership” aimed mainly at preserving the existing institutional architecture and distribution of power is politically toxic. Assertive leadership that seeks to impose solutions cooked up in Washington or European capitals – or between them – will prove less effective than participatory and inclusive governance. Solving the “crisis of governance” means providing new opportunities for the involvement of various types and constellations of actors in different policy sectors. What is needed is some form of what Burns (1978), in his classic work, termed “transformational leadership.” As the name implies, transformational leadership seeks transformation, often of institutions or rules. Leadership that seeks reform is a more sophisticated exercise than leadership that seeks to play by accepted rules in the pursuit of long-established goals. It embraces not only norm- and agenda-setting, but also – perhaps above all – coalition- and capacity-building. In practical terms, it must drive and shape, but not dictate, the reform of global governance. How to exert such transformational leadership is complicated. The “smart power” notion that combines hard and soft power (Nye 2008) provides a useful, but vague guiding principle whose implementation may take quite different forms in different policy fields. But its essence is combining the hard power of coercion with the soft power of persuasion. The US and Europe possess different kinds of hard power. America is capable of more coercion while the EU has resources – in the form of trade privileges or aid, but also sanctions – that make collective action (at least) possible even on hard security issues such as Iran. Yet, combining hard power with the power to persuade is extremely taxing for the transatlantic partners. Both must, first, coax collective action out of their highly compartmentalized governmental structures. Second, they must – ideally – combine resources and agree on productive divisions of labour (see Lindstrom 2005). Third, they must make the case for international action to publics whose appetite for international activism is, by recent measures, declining.

#### A nuclear Iran results in instability and results in ineffective deterrence

Kroenig and McNally ’13— Matthew, assistant professor and international relations field chair in the department of government at Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Robert, served as Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, March 2013 (Matthew and Robert, “Iranian Nukes and Global Oil,” The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 4.)djm

But the impact of sanctions on future Iranian production pales in comparison to the other geo-economic implications of nuclear weapons in Iran. A nuclear Iran will likely increase the frequency and scope of geopolitical conflict in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. While policy analysts continue to debate how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, most agree a nuclear-armed Iran would have grave repercussions for the region. In March 2012 President Obama stated that U.S. policy was to prevent—not contain—a nuclear-armed Iran, and he explained why: “The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation.”10 President Obama’s fears are well-founded. Iran harbors ambitious geopolitical goals. After national survival, Iran’s primary objective is to become the most dominant state in the Middle East. In terms of international relations theory, Iran is a revisionist power. Its master national-historical narrative holds that Iran is a glorious nation with a storied past, and that it has been cheated out of its rightful place as a leading nation: Like pre-World War I Germany and China today, it is determined to reclaim its place in the sun. Currently, Iran restrains its hegemonic ambitions because it is wary of U.S. or Israeli military responses—particularly the former. But if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, its adversaries would be forced to treat it with deference if not kid gloves, even in the face of provocative acts. Iran would achieve a degree of “inverted deterrence” against stronger states by inherently raising the stakes of any military conflict against it to the nuclear level.11 As such, nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a cover under which to implement its regional ambitions with diminished fear of a U.S. military reprisal. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up its support for terrorist and proxy groups attacking Israeli, Saudi and U.S. interests in the greater Middle East and around the world; increase the harassment of and attacks against naval and commercial vessels in and near the Persian Gulf; and be more aggressive in its coercive diplomacy, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to intimidate adversaries and harmless, weaker neighbors alike. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran would exacerbate current conflicts in the Middle East, and this likely bears jarring consequences for global oil prices. Because of the heightened threat to global oil supply that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose, market participants would certainly add a large “risk premium” to oil prices. Oil prices reflect perceived risk in addition to information on actual events or conditions in the market. Recent history shows that even without nuclear weapons, Iran-related events in the Middle East have affected oil prices on fears they could spark a regional war. Traders bid up oil prices in January 2006 when the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council. In subsequent months, news reports about heated Iranian rhetoric and military exercises helped to drive crude prices up further. The surprise outbreak of the Israel-Hizballah war in 2006, not entirely unrelated to concerns about Iran, triggered a $4 per barrel spike on contagion fears. The Iran risk premium subsided after 2007, but a roughly $10–$15 per barrel (10 percent) risk premium returned in early 2012 after the United States and the European Union put in place unusually tough sanctions and hawkish rhetoric on both sides heated up. A survey of nearly two dozen traders and analysts conducted by the Rapidan Group found that a protracted conventional conflict between the United States and Iran that resulted in a three-week closure of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a $25 per barrel rise in oil prices, despite the use of strategic petroleum reserves.12 Were Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, the risk premium would greatly exceed the $4–$15 per barrel (roughly 4–15 percent at current prices) already caused by a non-nuclear Iran.13 We expect a belligerent, nuclear-armed Iran would likely embed a risk premium of at least $20–$30 per barrel and spikes of $30–$100 per barrel in the event of actual conflict. Such price increases would be extremely harmful to economic growth and employment. The challenges a nuclear-armed Iran would pose for the oil market are exacerbated by a prospective diminished U.S. ability to act as guarantor of stability in the Gulf. U.S. military presence and intervention has been critical to resolving past threats or geopolitical crises in the region. It has also calmed oil markets in the past. Examples include escorting oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, the destruction of much of Iran’s surface fleet in response to Iran’s mining the Gulf in 1988 and leading a coalition to repel Saddam Hussein’s short-lived invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Currently, the United States can use and threaten to use force against Iran without fear that Iran will retaliate with nuclear weapons. When Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in the past, for example, the United States has announced that it would reopen the Strait if Iran went through with it, confident that the U.S. military could quickly prevail in any conventional conflict with Iran while running very little risk of retaliation. If Iran had nuclear weapons, however, U.S. military options would be constrained by inverted deterrence. U.S. threats to use force to reopen the Strait could be countered by Iranian threats to use devastatingly deadly force against U.S. allies, bases or forces in the region. Such threats might not be entirely credible since the U.S. military would control any imaginable escalation ladder up to and including the nuclear threshold, but it wouldn’t be entirely incredible, either, given the risk of accident or inadvertent nuclear use in a high-stakes crisis. If, further, Iran develops ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States—and the annual report of the U.S. Department of Defense estimates this could happen as soon as 2015—Iran could also threaten nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland in retaliation for the use of conventional forces in the region. Any U.S. President would have to think long and hard about using force against Iran if it entailed a risk of nuclear war, even a nuclear war that the United States would win. Most worrisome, an unstable, poly-nuclear Middle East will mean that nuclear weapons will be ever-present factors in most, if not all, future regional conflicts. As President Obama noted in the remarks excerpted above, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other states might follow suit. Nuclear weapons in these states would further complicate the nuclear balance in the region and potentially extend the boundaries of any nuclear exchange. Even if Iran’s leaders are less reckless and suicidal than their rhetoric would suggest, international politics, crises and miscalculation do not end when countries acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers still challenge nuclear-armed adversaries. As the early decades of the Cold War remind us, nuclear-armed states do sometimes resort to nuclear brinkmanship that can lead to high-stakes nuclear standoffs. We were lucky to survive the Cold War without suffering a massive nuclear exchange; President Kennedy estimated that the probability of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone was as high as 50 percent.14 The reference to the early days of the Cold War is not merely decorative here. Nearly all of the conditions that helped us avoid nuclear war during the latter half of the Cold War are absent from the Iran-Israel-U.S. nuclear balance. Then, there were only two players, both with secure, second-strike capabilities and strategic depth; relatively long flight times for ballistic missiles between states, enabling all sides to eschew launch-on-warning postures; clear lines of communication between capitals; and more. In a high-stakes nuclear crisis with Iran and its adversaries, there is a real risk that things could spiral out of control and result in nuclear war**.**

#### US-EU relations solve nuclear war

John S. Duffield 94, analyst, “NATO’s Functions After the Cold War,” POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY v. 109 n. 5, Winter 1994, pp. 753-787, ASP.

Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe - as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies - remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.(11)

## 2ac

### Fiat Double Bind

#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—effective choices regarding Latin American foreign policy require the ability to test the real world outcomes of our scholarship and advocacies.

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

#### We DO have our hands on the levers of power—The 1NCs link arguments are overly pessimistic and politically debilitating

Slater 04 (David. David Slater is Professor of Social and Political Geography at Loughborough University. 2004. Geopolitics and¶ the Post-colonial¶ Rethinking North–South Relations. Blackwell Publishing. )

Globalization from above can be thought of as another name for¶ neo-liberal globalization, a process that is founded on privatization,¶ competitiveness, deregulation, standardization and more profoundly¶ the commodification of social life. For Falk (1999) this kind of globalization is predatory and homogenizing, whereas globalization from¶ below is associated with heterogeneity, diversity and bottom-up participatory politics. This distinction can be helpful and avoids the problems¶ associated with a full-blown denunciation of globalization in its entirety,¶ from which the alternative tends towards a somewhat uncritical notion¶ of localization. It can be suggested that while a neo-liberal globalization¶ from above promotes competitiveness, hierarchy, conformity and the¶ primacy of the cash nexus, globalization from below can help expand the ethic of participatory democracy to a variety of spatial levels, not just¶ the global but the supra-national, national, regional, local and community levels. It is not that more power at one level of governance will¶ necessarily disempower people at other levels, but that the empowerment¶ of local and national communities requires the extension of democratic¶ principles at the global and supra-national levels. As Brecher et al. (2000)¶ constructively suggest, globalization from below requires a framework¶ that recognizes this interdependence of spatial spheres or levels. It can¶ also be suggested here that when globalization from above intersects¶ with globalization from below, the point of maximum tension will tend¶ to locate itself at the national level – what I previously referred to as the¶ geopolitical pivot, where the pressures from above and below interact¶ with the most impact.

#### Take a leap of faith – we should attempt to build truth even if everything revolves around simulation─

Fawver, 8 [Kurt, Master of Arts Engilsh – Cleveland State University, “ DESTRUCTION IN SEARCH OF HOPE: BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATION, AND CHUCK PALAHNIUK’S CHOKE,” August 2008, <http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Fawver%20Kurt%20D.pdf?csu1219269969>]

If Palahniuk’s Choke was merely an excellent resource for understanding Baudrillardian theory, it would still be a valuable text. As it stands, however, Choke expands on the ideas of simulation and mediation and struggles to free itself from the snares of Baudrillard’s ultimate unreality. Through a regime of breakdown and disorder, the text fights to emerge from “the end or disappearance of… the real, the social, history, and other key features of modernity” (Best 133). It attempts to create a meaningful correspondence between signifiers and signifieds, between images and meanings. While Baudrillard posits that “everything can and has been done, and all we can do is to assemble the… pieces of our culture and proceed to its extremities,” Choke resists such reasoning and, in fact, runs through stages of assembly and extremism to demonstrate how utterly futile and pointless they are (Best 137). Choke seeks to blow apart those very reproductions that Baudrillard claims cause the implosion of meaning. Essentially, the text advocates a clean sweep of communication, a discarding of all mediated reality. In Choke, as in many other Palahniuk novels, the flow of true meaning can only return to society and individuals once all mediated, simulated, reproduced “meanings” are razed. Thus, the text does glorify destruction, but it is destruction in search of hope, destruction that will, presumably, lead to creation. Victor’s eventual identity collapse, and his subsequent rebuilding, is paradigmatic of Choke’s anti-Baudrillardian philosophy. Victor begins by compiling the persona of a dysfunctional, perpetually orphaned child-cum-adult from mediated symbols of “dysfunction.” His sex addiction and his compulsion to simulate choking in restaurants are symptoms of this poor attempt at constructing a workable identity. When the “traumatized child-now-in-adulthood” simulation fails, Victor turns to new mediated identities: Christ and Antichrist. These personas also lack any depth or connection to Victor’s core being and are, subsequently, discarded. As the text progresses, Victor drops all attempts at creating his identity from the palette of society’s mass-produced conceptions. He pleads for someone to “just show me one thing in this world that is what you’d think” (Choke 205). But, as no inherent realness exists in contemporary society, no one can show Victor a thing or an individual with inherent meaning. Therefore, his only option is to extricate himself from the culture of simulation by cutting himself off from his own history and other individuals’ mediated perceptions of his past. In a moment of clarity, Victor realizes that he must reduce his identity to its simplest, most immediate terms because “There’s no way you can get the past right. You can pretend. You can delude yourself, but you can’t re-create what’s over” (Choke 273). Thus, by the end of the novel, Victor is more a blank page than a fully fleshed character. Rather than continuing to allow his identity to be an ever-evolving reactive simulation that forms in reference to external mediation, he becomes a clean slate on which he can write his own self-generated identity. He slakes off most of the factors that traditionally 26 inform self; familial expectation, personal history, and even conventional emotion are all missing from his identity at the text’s close. As Victor explains, “For the first time in longer than I can remember, I feel peaceful. Not happy. Not sad. Not anxious. Not horny. Just all the higher parts of my brain closing up shop…. I’m simplifying myself” (Choke 282). The implication is that, in order to escape simulation, Victor must revert to a more primitive state. His thoughts are of an essentially basic order; he no longer seeks out “deeper” meanings or alternate referentials. Instead, events, feelings, people, and things simply are what they appear to be, without connection to external mediation. For Victor, the universe of multiple signified meanings for any given signifier is no longer relevant. He has destroyed his perception of alternate reference and, therefore, has limited his field of meaning to exclusively intrinsic values. Such perception comes at a price, however. Victor has to sacrifice a world of possibility, of variable signification, for concrete meaning. He can no longer ponder whether an image means one thing or another; rather, an image will, to Victor, always be fixed to one referent. In a sense, then, he has given up the parts of his “higher brain,” namely a rigorous intellect and boundless creativity, in order to gain a foothold into solid reality and flee Baudrillard’s infinite simulatory spiral. Whereas Baudrillard “critiques… representational thought which is confident that it is describing reality as it is,” Victor embraces such thoughts with open arms (Best 140). Victor is intelligent enough to understand that choosing a path of selfimposed communicative primitivism is the only measure of prevention against accruing a new body of simulacra. The polar opposite of Victor is Tracy, the woman to whom he loses his virginity. She is the prime example of an individual forever lost in Baudrillardian post27 structuralism, representing everything that Victor, or any person, may become when nihilistic acceptance of simulation has infiltrated every aspect of self. Victor meets her on an airplane, in an unlocked bathroom. She takes flights, enters the restroom, leaves the door unlocked, then waits until someone walks in on her and attempts to engage them in a sexual encounter. When Victor questions her aberrant behavior, she replies that “the answer is there is no answer… when you think about it, there’s no good reason to do anything. There is no point… people… don’t want an orgasm as much as they just want to forget. Everything.” (Choke 256-7). Clearly, life in the Baudrillardian void has taken its toll on this woman. Tracy ponders “Why do I do anything? …I’m educated enough to talk myself out of any plan. To deconstruct any fantasy. Explain away any goal. I’m so smart I can negate any dream.” (Choke 257). She is the essence of Baudrillard’s postconstructionist theory; in her, the text introduces an embodiment of hyper-intellectualism that has cut away all the joy, fulfillment, and meaning from life and reality and, subsequently, sees only a vacuum underlying all existence. Her nihilism leads into a quest for extrication from the ultimate emptiness and, thus, works as the catalyst for her sexual addiction. She wants to find meaning and absolute reality but will always be forced, due to her intelligence and her deconstructive ability, to undermine the very goal she is trying to achieve. For Tracy, meaning is impossible not because it has objectively disappeared, but because she cannot accept simple truths or non-multiplicitous signifiers. She thrives on the complexity of reality and, therefore, will never be satisfied by a simplistic interpretation, even if the simplistic interpretation is that for which she yearns. Through Tracy’s unsatisfied, perpetually-wandering nature, the text puts forth the implication that 28 maintaining such an unflinching post-constructionist mindset has no future other than disappointment, dysfunction, and existential despair. Indeed, Choke implicitly attacks Baudrillard’s blasé acceptance of simulation and attempts to show the ramifications of such acceptance. Hence, while the critical perspective from which Baudrillard’s theory stems is akin to a scalpel, cutting deeper and deeper into the body of reality to reveal unending layers of nothingness, Choke advocates a return to a bandaged surface; it strives toward the revitalization of easily accessible signifieds, and, thus, shuns Tracy’s (see also Baudrillard’s) system of thought that only seeks to forever prove the disappearance of meaning. Therefore, the text is ultimately moving beyond Baudrillard by “emphasizing creation over destruction” and promoting the deemphasization of post-constructionist critical inquiry as a means of understanding reality (Kavadlo 12). To further illustrate the resurrection of meaningful signifiers and images, the text introduces Denny, Victor’s best friend. Denny is a recovering sex addict who, throughout the text, earnestly seeks rehabilitation. As sex addictions in Choke seem to be symptomatic of a fatalistic surrender to the simulatory world, Denny is the one character who consistently seeks out a means of resistance. Strangely enough, this resistance takes the form of thousands of rocks. As the novel progresses, Denny builds an enormous rock collection and, with those rocks, embarks on the construction of a mystery structure in an empty field. He enlists Victor’s help and, when a local reporter comes to interview Victor and Denny about the construction project, Victor’s responses are veiled in a haze of ignorance. Victor recalls the dialogue between himself and the reporter, saying that she asked: “‘This structure you’re building, is it a house?’ And I say we don’t know. 29 ‘Is it a church of some kind?’ We don’t know. …‘What are you building, then?’ We won’t know until the very last rock is set. ‘But when will that be?’ We don’t know.” (Choke 263-4). Victor’s reticence with the reporter is not due to any particular stigma or grudge against the media. Rather, his unforthcoming answers are a result of a new (or perhaps ancient) mode of perception and, thus, communication. Instead of focusing on the possibilities of the stone structure or its eventual outcome, Denny instructs Victor to focus on the process of building, alone. He says that “the longer we can keep building, the longer we can keep creating, the more will be possible. The longer we can tolerate being incomplete,” the better (Choke 264). Initially, this statement appears to echo Baudrillard’s sentiments, with a perpetual process of building that leads nowhere and creation that actually creates nothing. Yet, precisely the opposite is true. By compelling the rock structure to remain a work-in-progress without a definitive end, Denny has squashed any simulatory nature the building may possess. He and Victor are not putting stones atop one another to create any of the long-mediated structures of society. The stone building is not a house or a church or any other structure of convention and, therefore, is not founded upon any previous referent. Denny’s rock building is not trying to simulate any other structure; it is simply allowed to rise and become whatever it eventually becomes. With the stone structure, Denny is attempting to introduce a product that holds inherent, unmediated meaning. As soon as Denny or Victor would conclude that the building is a house or a church, then it would, necessarily, begin to take on aspects of those structures. It would begin to simulate a house or a church. But, by allowing the structure to grow almost organically, Denny has set the 30 groundwork for a signifier that may finally be connected with an inherent meaning, with a concrete undeniable reality. The price for cultivating an unmediated, unsimulatory reality is high, however. Both Denny and Victor must discard the realm of speculation and conjecture. In order to maintain a sense of the real, all possibility outside a thing’s readily apparent meaning must vanish. Denny and Victor do not know what the stone building will be because they don’t want to know until it is finished. They choose a path of ignorance so that realness may reassert itself within the structure without being crushed by external mediated “reality.” Basically, Denny and Victor must become simple, single-minded individuals who have no need for multiplicitous signs and no desire for a constant outgrowth of discourse. Theirs is a reality that requires no mediation, no simulation, and, hence, no emptiness. Such a lifestyle choice flies in the face of our contemporary world, where formulating variable meanings for signifiers and expanding the possible field of referentials for images is second-nature. The very fiber of critical theory, or of practically any academic discipline, hinges on increased speculation, on infinitely sprawling discourses, and on the complication of texts, signifiers, and reality itself. Choke’s solution for escaping Baudrillard’s simulation is to escape that same incisively critical manner of thinking. In doing so, Denny and Victor become primitive postpostmodern men. The duo simultaneously evolve and devolve communication; they usher reality back into a signifier but cause the collapse of complexity. Indeed, “many of the seemingly random transgressive acts perpetrated by the characters in Palahniuk’s fiction,” such as Denny and Victor’s intentional ignorance, “fall within an understanding of entropy as a force for renewal and meaning” (Sartain 32). Thus, while Denny may 31 have set society on a course for a neo-stone age, his rock structure may actually be something that simply “is what it is.” Victor’s mother, Ida, is an individual who also manages to cut ties with simulation, but in a much different, and arguably more destructive, manner. Her perspective on reality, like the neo-primitivism of Victor and Denny, strives to attain communion with a long-lost realness. However, Ida takes a much more direct and assertive approach. She uses drugs to “simplify” her state of mind. As Ida explains, “Trichloroethane… All my extensive testing has shown this to be the best treatment for a dangerous excess of human knowledge” (Choke 148). She is attempting to clear away the debris of contemporary society’s all-consuming media (and with it mediation and simulation) by chemically altering her consciousness, thus allowing her to ignore its multiplicity of disembodied voices and images that would, otherwise, crush her unmediated, individual perception of reality. Ida claims that she can see things as they truly are when she is on drugs. She says that the trichloroethane makes the world appear “without the framework of language. Without the cage of associations… without looking through the lens of everything she knew was true…” (Choke 149). Through her druginduced highs, Ida is stripping away mediation and, therefore, making simulation impossible. Without a vast body of mediated meanings to draw upon, Ida is forced to view the world as it actually is, in its simplest terms. She has rid herself of simulation and allowed realness to seep back into images. However, the reality is fleeting and dissipates back into the cacophony of Baudrillard’s simulatory universe as soon as Ida is clean once more. Even worse, the constant drug use takes its toll on Ida; over the course of the text, she ends up with a perpetual bloody nose and, ultimately, is reduced to a 32 feeble, emaciated skeleton. Idea proves that, while escaping Baudrillard’s simulation may be possible in a number of ways, the return to reality can come at an indescribably steep price. Ida is also critical to understanding Choke’s postulation on the manner in which society may be galvanized into forsaking simulation. It is “Ida’s ideology of adventure, her belief in the restorative power of chaos [that] serves to unbalance comfortable homogeneity. She… seeks to create meaning and potential for change through random chaotic acts” (Sartain 33). Ida vandalizes merchandise in stores, kidnaps children, and causes public disturbances all in the service of disrupting complacent adherence to mediated reality. She knows that “a fire alarm is never about a fire, anymore” and tries to disseminate this knowledge across society, albeit obliquely and illegally (Choke 161). Ida challenges simulation by creating real panic and real excitement. Her acts of destruction are aimed squarely at bringing a sense of reality back into a populace that, normally, experiences events and emotions in a heavily mediated environment. Ida causes people to feel true fear, to experience events that are precisely what they appear to be: actual, unsimulated danger. However, there is no proof that Ida’s regime of philosophy-based crime alters the perception or behavior of anyone but Victor over the long term. For a brief moment, the victims of Ida’s crimes may experience a true, unmediated, unsimulated event, but as soon as the danger has been resolved, the contemporary culture of mass media creeps back in and continues to suffocate with its hollow signifiers. Therefore, Ida’s attempts to empower society may be entirely pointless. While her personal freedom from Baudrillard’s simulatory world is assured, she cannot force others to choose the same path of informed, intelligible ignorance. 33 Indeed, Ida’s failure to enact social change exhibits the textual implication that release from simulation must begin in the most intensely personal and introspective realms and radiate outward. Perhaps meaning can be reconnected with images, but, as Choke demonstrates, such reconnection must be instituted at the individual level long before it can solidify into an absolute reality upon which everyone agrees. If Choke’s resolution to the Baudrillardian dilemma seems somewhat perfunctory or abrupt, it would be in keeping with the theoretical concerns of the text. In a simulatory reality, where all information is produced and mediated to individuals at a hyperkinetic speed, it would be logical for a solution or paradigmatic rebellion to arise just as quickly, given that this solution would still, necessarily, have a point of emergence within a system that is unable to slow the production of information, images, and signifiers. Thus, the text’s resolution – an idea that works as a competing perception of reality – appears as quickly and as suddenly as any other random image or information structure; the system of mindless, endless generation has unwittingly generated its own demise. That Choke ends without much exploration of its resolution to simulatory reality is also reasonable, given that such an open-ended future is antithetical to the very principle of Baudrillardian nihilism. The text fights despair and a defeated acceptance of missing reality with unabashed romanticism. With the novel ending shortly after the characters have lain in place their newfound adherence to knowing ignorance, the future is uncertain. Anything could happen to reality following the close of the text; a reunion of images and meaning is as possible as the continuation of hollow simulation. Victor and Denny’s plan for identity-formation and reality-perception may lead to the eventual destruction of all simulacra or it may be entirely useless. The reader is left in a state of 34 unknowing, of hope for meaning-filled future. Such a conclusion is impossible in a Baudrillardian scheme of reality. Under Baudrillard’s critical eye, the world has reached a point where struggle against the forces of simulation is impossible. In Baudrillardian theory, there is no hope for the retrieval of meaning; rather, the process of simulacra will continue, unabated. In answer to this bleak nihilistic view, Choke presents an open space, an ending that is more the beginning of a competing discourse than a summation of all that has come before it. There is no definite success at the end of the text, nor is there assured defeat. The text’s concluding indeterminacy, its allowance for hope, separates it from Baudrillard’s nihilism and reinforces the supposition that escape from simulation is, in fact, possible.

#### Saying NO to catastrophe has value regardless of inevitability—

Barash and Lipton, 1985

David P., Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington (Seattle) and Judith Eve, psychiatrist at the Swedish Medical Center in Washington, “The Caveman and the Bomb” p.261-267

Fortunately, whatever genetic imperatives operate in Homo sapiens, they are unlikely to extend directly to nuclear weapons, any more than a tendency for body adornment necessarily leads to a Christian Dior necktie or a New Guinea penis sheath. The general patterns that char­acterize today's nuclear Neanderthal are, in fact, general, nonspecific. They may incline us to a degree of saber rattling that seems likely to trouble the world in one way or another as long as we and the world persist, but these patterns don't require that the saber be nuclear. On this level the nuclear Neanderthal doesn't even have to play "as if": We are called on to behave not as if we had free will regarding the renun­ciation of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, but to act in accord with that free will, which we assuredly have. That is honest empowerment indeed. Teilhard de Chardin wrote about the "Omega point" at which human beings become conscious of their own evolution and, hence, of them­selves. He called for a recognition of unity and connectedness, with our speciesborn on this planet and spread over its entire surface, coming gradually to form around its earthly matrix a single, major organic unity, enclosed upon itself; a single, hypercomplex, hyperconcentrated, hyperconscious arch-molecule, coextensive with the heavenly body on which it is born.9 In overcoming the Neanderthal mentality we could finally become hu­man, or perhaps even more than this, at last able to answer affirmatively the question: Is there intelligent life on earth? As poet and novelist Nikos Kazantzakis pleaded, "Let us unite, let us hold each other tightly, let us merge our hearts, let us create for Earth a brain and a heart, let us give a human meaning to the superhuman struggle."'° Something has spoken to me in the night, burning the tapers of the waning year; something has spoken in the night, and told me I shall die, I know not where. Saying: "To lose the earth you know, for greater knowing; to lose the life you have, for greater life; to leave the friends you loved, for greater loving; to find a land more kind than home, more large than earth—Whereupon the pillars of this earth are founded, toward which the conscience of the world is tending—a wind is rising and the rivers flow." THOMAS WOLFE 11 For the existentialists the essence of humanity is in saying no—no to injustice, to murder, to the absurd and dehumanizing universe itself But the ultimate existential tragedy is that in the long run, saying no cannot succeed. Each of us will eventually die, and this looming inevitability makes our lives absurd. By our very aliveness we are therefore embarked on a hopeless campaign, which may yield some victories, but only tem­porary ones. Like a cosmic poker game, we are playing against the house, but in this game the house never loses; even if we are briefly ahead, we cannot cash in our chips and go home winners. There is no other place to go. At the close of The Plague, Albert Camus lets us inside the thoughts of Dr. Rieux, who had courageously battled a typhoid epidemic in a North African city. Just as the plague has finally been overcome, and the survivors were celebrating in the streets, Dr. Rieux understood that the tale he had to tell could not be one of a final victory. It could be only the record of what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never-ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers. And, indeed, as he listened to the cries of joy rising from the town, Rieux remembered that such joy is always imperiled. He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.12 But effectiveness per se is not the issue. The rats may come again, and with them the plague, just as every person now alive must some day die. The real question—for would-be post-Neanderthals no less than for existential thinkers—concerns the obligation of human beings in the face of such a world. "In everlasting terms—those of eternity," wrote Thomas Wolfe, "there is no greater wisdom than the wisdom of Ecclesiastes, no acceptance finally so true as the stern fatalism of the rock. Man was born to live, to suffer, and to die, and what befalls him is a tragic lot. There is no denying this in the final end." Nonetheless, he concludes, we must "deny it all along the way." Although admitting the "stern lesson of acceptance," which calls for acknowledging the "tragic under-weft of life into which man is born, through which he must live, out of which he must die," Wolfe described his intention, "having accepted it, to try to do what was before me, what I could do, with all my might."13 Camus went farther. According to Greek mythology, Sisyphus had been condemned to spend eternity rolling an enormous rock up a steep hill; when the rock neared the top, it would roll back down, and Sisyphus would have to start again. In "The Myth of Sisyphus," Sisyphus serves not only as a metaphor for humanity but, as Camus sees it, as a model as well. His struggle is not only self-defining, but also ennobling. More­over, Camus concludes that Sisyphus is happy. There are some important differences between Sisyphus and Dr. Rieux, and the post-Neanderthal. For one thing, Dr. Rieux could afford to lose many battles and even many patients, just as Sisyphus can tolerate the constant victory of gravity. Sisyphus, after all, is crushed neither mentally nor literally by his stone; no matter how many people die from a plague, some survive. Dr. Rieux will never eradicate the plague; his glory comes from his fighting on in the face of that knowledge. Sisyphus will never succeed in his labor; his happiness comes from his self-defi­nition, knowing his futility. Unlike them, however, we are not doomed to failure. Before beginning their combat the Roman gladiators used to face the spectators in the Coliseum and announce, "We who are about to die salute you." Two thousand years later the poet W. H. Auden updated their credo: "We who are about to die demand a miracle." Like the gladiators, Auden was concerned about the end of his life, what Kurt Vonnegut calls "plain old death." And to overcome plain old personal death, nothing less than a bona fide miracle in the theological sense will do. We can say no to personal death and an absurd universe all we like, but in the end, like Rieux and Sisyphus, we are bound to lose. The good news, however, is that the other kind of death—the mass, meaningless annihilation that would come with nuclear war—is not inevitable. Unlike the overturning of personal death, no divine intervention is required. Unlike the eruption of a volcano or the brewing of a hurricane, nuclear war is a man-made problem, with man- and woman-made solutions. Unlike Auden and the gladiators, we have a precious and unique op­portunity: We can say no to our Neanderthal mentality, to our genes. We are the only creatures on earth who can do this. We have this op­portunity because our genes whisper to us, they do not shout. They can be stubborn, but they can be persuaded, cajoled, bribed, or, if necessary, simply overruled and strong-armed into submission. Dr. Rieux learned in a time of pestilence that "there are more things to admire in men than to despise." Similarly, the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts, if we choose to be. We can be greater than the sum of our genes. If that is our decision, evolution can't do a thing about it. Making that decision is the supreme test of our humanity, our greatest challenge and our most sublime opportunity. Nonetheless, war touches a deep chord in most human beings, and the decision to say no will not be an easy one. Sigmund Freud com­mented that prohibitions and taboos by their very existence strongly suggest a preexisting desire to perform the prohibited act, otherwise there would be no need for the prohibition: "What no human soul desires, there is no need to prohibit; it is automatically excluded. The very em­phasis of the commandment Thou Shalt Not Kill makes it certain that we spring from an endless ancestry of murderers, with whom the lust for killing was in the blood, as possibly it is to this day with ourselves." He also emphasized that wars occur because nations, like individuals, "still obey their immediate passions far more readily than their inter­ests,"14 a succinct summary of the plight of today's Neanderthal. Prior to World War I especially, the making of war was generally considered a laudable activity. Admiration and often adulation flowed to such men as Alexander, Achilles, Caesar, Charlemagne, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Robert E. Lee. The first masterpiece of Western literature (Homer's Iliad) and the first histories (Herodotus' account of the Persian Wars, and Thucydides' study of the Peloponnesian War) focused on war. Western culture is by no means unique in its glorification of war, as witness the cultures of ancient Africa, Mexico, and Fiji. Ac­cordingly, "the war against war," as William James pointed out, "is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party."15 The fact is that war and sanctified violence have had a powerful and persistent appeal cross‑culturally, although not in all cultures, and throughout human history. Thus, as James said, war has come to be seen as "preserving our ideals of hardihood," a supreme test of human effectiveness, the most de­manding and, hence, for many people, the most rewarding activity of which they are capable. It is revealing that whereas "war" exists in the plural, "peace" is conceived only in the singular. (A similar pattern obtains in other lan­guages as well.) We have the War of the Roses, the Napoleonic wars, the Maori wars, World Wars I and II, and so on, but only one peace, despite the fact that there must have been as many different kinds of peace as different kinds of wars. As with the Eskimos, who are said to have eleven words for what in English we simply call "snow," or the Bedouin, who have more than one hundred words for "camel," human beings distin­guish carefully among whatever is important to them. For countless generations the human Neanderthal has been obsessed with war, and indifferent to peace, even slightly bored with it. When and if peace becomes as appealing as war, perhaps then we shall focus on it, identi­fying its varieties and nuances. Words signifying normalcy, like "peace," "health," and "sanity," have lagged behind their pathological counter­parts; thus, we know more about diseases than about wellness. Yet, as the holistic health movements are demonstrating, in order to practice preventive medicine, it is necessary to define, describe, and validate the state of wellness before one can act effectively to preserve it. Much of war's appeal, according to William James, comes from its aura of extremis, embodying the most dangerous and strenuous of human struggles, and hence becoming strangely ennobling despite (or in part, because of) its extraordinary horror. The contemplation of war, the prep­aration for war, and in many cases even the fighting of war is something that most Neanderthals find compelling, exciting, and even fun. Accord­ing to James, this gut-level attraction "cannot be met effectively by mere counter-insistency on war's expensiveness and horror. The horror makes the thrill; and when the question is of getting the extremist and supremist out of human nature, talk of expense sounds ignominious." He therefore proposed a "substitute for war's disciplinary function"—his now-famous Moral Equivalent of War, suggesting a peacetime conscription which would not so much overcome the Neanderthal mentality as bypass it with a bit of social ju jitsu, sublimating dangerous human urges into constructive activity.16 In a sense, the Peace Corps was a practical example of James's con­ception; but a real peace corps can be fashioned only when peacemaking becomes recognized as an acceptable and active verb, and when peace takes its rightful place at our own core. Ironically, in a world society that is increasingly intolerant of personal violence, that forbids murder, assault, even the threat of physical abuse, and in which fistfights and even bullying are grossly out of place, in diplomatic parlors, war and the threat of war remain acceptable. Rather than finding a moral equivalent of war, we have collectively made war itself into a morally acceptable form of violence such that societies can contemplate and plan actions that would be unacceptable if undertaken by its individual members. Those old Neanderthal cravings are still alive and well, running just beneath the surface, needing only the slightest provocation to erupt, even in the most sophisticated and presumably civilized societies. Just let some Americans be taken hostage in Iran, or a Korean airliner violate Soviet airspace, and suddenly the cavemen are at it again and the old predictable tribal bellowing resumes. Homo, called sapiens, is all but drowned in an atavistic avalanche of anger, distrust, and intolerance. The structures of peace, built up with such care and needing such nurturance, seem woefully delicate and fragile before the crude, easily evoked Neanderthal onslaught. But here we note Theodore Roethke's observation, "In a dark time, the eye begins to see." Perhaps by thinking, feeling, and believing, we can see through our Neanderthal mentality, and forge a new awareness where we confront our limitations and our strengths, able to bend, but nonetheless to resist and not to break. A major impediment to this awareness has been our ignorance that the Neanderthal mentality even exists. There is also the double irony of pessimism—the assumption that the Neanderthal mentality, under the alias of "human nature," is un­changeable. Insofar as it succeeds, this assumption is a triumph for the Neanderthal mentality and, moreover, a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is also seductive; it leaves each of us free to go ahead with his or her own little life, all the while treading on unstable slopes, heedless of the danger. "The challenge to humans in our time is whether they can become aroused not just over small but over larger dangers," observed Norman Cousins. "Whether they can perceive universal problems as well as per­sonal ones, whether they can become as concerned over their survival as a species as they are over their jobs."" This arousal is growing, in part because the overriding universal problem is increasingly perceived as an intensely personal one, because it threatens the deepest personal values of every human being, and also because it demands a committed personal response. Perhaps we shall have the final laugh after all, and perhaps the laugh will be on evolution. In giving so much autonomy to the bodies they create, the genes of Homo sapiens have unwittingly sewn the seeds of their own overthrow (not the seeds of their destruction, for that would mean our own demise as well). It is precisely—and only—by overthrowing our genes, by taking the unprecedented step and saying no to their dangerous and insistent whisperings, that we can preserve them, along with everything else. By saying no to that aspect of our genes, we say yes to life, to love, and to hope, and even to the continuation of those troublesome genes themselves. There is no better time. "At this moment," wrote Albert Camus, when each of us must fit an arrow to his bow and enter the lists anew, to reconquer, within history and in spite of it, that which he owns already, the thin yield of his fields, the brief love of this earth, at this moment when at last a man is born, it is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies. The bow bends; the wood complains. At the moment of supreme tension, there will leap into flight an unswerving arrow, a shaft that is inflexible and free.18 Maybe in the long run we shall all laugh together, as through our negation of the Neanderthal mentality we arrive at a new affirmation, a higher level of life, its most exalted accomplishment. This will be the point at which, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to universal murder, we resolve to overcome the Neanderthal mentality and thereby transcend, if not overcome, our biology itself.

#### Evaluate these impacts – consequences matter

Isaac, 2002 (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” *Dissent*, Spring)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli,Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and HannahArendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility.The concern may be morally laudable, reflectinga kind of personal integrity, but it suffersfrom three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make commoncause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is alwaysa potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiatingviolence, it refuses in principle tooppose certain violent injustices with any effect;and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good”may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is thelesson of communism in the twentieth century:it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere oridealistic; it is equally important, always, to askabout the effects of pursuing these goals andto judge these effects in pragmatic and historicallycontextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Reject the infinite number of root causes that debilitate action—Focus on strategic deterrence and democracy are key to adverting crisis escalation—

John Moore 4 chaired law prof, UVA. Frm first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State, Beyond the Democratic Peace, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis

[\*393] If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. n158 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come. [\*394] A useful framework for thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State and War, n159 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high-risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision to go to war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high-risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant - I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who are disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposed to high-risk behavior. We might also want to keep open the possibility that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence. Nondemocracies' leaders can have different perceptions of the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, the key to war avoidance is understanding that major international war is critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three - specifically an absence of [\*395] democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high-risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. n160

### Spanos

#### The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (s

ee Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### Only our framework can change economics – they re-entrench the current system

**Scott, 04** – Allen J., Department of Geography, University of California–Los Angeles (“A perspective of economic geography,” Journal of Economic Geography, vol. 4, 2004, http://ecamp.usach.cl/Portales/digeo/asignaturas/geografia\_economica/GE\_8.pdf)

A prospective economic geography capable of dealing with the contemporary world must hew closely, it seems to me, to the following programmatic goals if it is to achieve a powerful purchase on both scientific insight and progressive political strategy. 1. To begin at the beginning: economic geography needs to work out a theoretical re-description of capitalism as a structure of production and consumption and as an engine of accumulation, taking into account the dramatic **changes** that have occurred in recent decades in such phenomena as technology, forms of industrial and corporate organization, financial systems, labor markets, and so on. This theoretical re-description must be sensitive to the generic or quasi-generic forms of capitalist development that occur in different times in different places, which, in turn, entails attention to the kinds of issues that regulation theorists have￼identified under the general rubric of regimes of accumulation (Aglietta, 1976; Lipietz, 1986). 2. In addition to these economic concerns, we must recognize that contemporary capitalism is intertwined with enormously heterogeneous forms of social and cultural life, and that **no one element** of this conjoint field **is** necessarily **reducible to the other.** Directions of causality and influence across this field are a matter of empirical investigation, not of theoretical pre-judgment. Note that in this formulation, class becomes only one possible dimension of social existence out of a multiplicity of other actual and possible dimensions. 3. This nexus of economic, social, and cultural relationships constitutes a creative field or environment within which complex processes of entrepreneurship, learning, and innovation occur. Geographers have a special interest in deciphering the spatial logic of this field and in demonstrating how it helps to shape locational dynamics. 4. In combination with these modalities of economic and social reality, we need to reserve a specific analytical and descriptive space for collective action and institutional order at many different levels of spatial and **organizational scale** (the firm, the local labor market, the region, **the nation**, etc.), together with a due sense of the political tensions and rivalries that run throughout this sphere of human development. By the same token, a vibrant economic geography will always not only be openly policy-relevant (Markusen, 1999), but also politically engaged. A key question in this context is how to build local institutional frameworks that promote both economic success and social justice. 5. We must recognize that social and economic relations are often extremely durable, and that they have a propensity to become independent in varying degree of the individuals caught up within them. This means that any normative account of social transformation and political strategy, must deal seriously with the idea that there are likely to be stubborn resistances to change rooted in these same relations. The solutions to this problem proposed by sociologists like Bourdieu (1972) and Giddens (1979) strike me as providing reasonable bases for pushing forward in this respect, for they explicitly recognize the inertia of social structures while simultaneously insisting on the integrity of individual human volition. Unfortunately, these solutions (most especially the structure-agency formulation of Giddens) have been much diluted in recent years by reinterpretations that lean increasingly heavily on the agency side of the equation, partly as a reflection of the cultural turn, partly out of a misplaced fear of falling into the pit of determinism.5 Invocations of unmediated agency (or, for that matter, neoclassical utility) as an explanatory variable in social science are often little more than confessions of ignorance, in the sense that when we are unable to account for certain kinds of relationships or events, we are often tempted to fall back on the reassuring notion that things are thus and so for no other reason than because that’s the way we want them to be, irrespective of any underlying structural conditions. 6. A corollary of the structured organization and sunk costs of social life is that economic relationships (especially when they are locationally interrelated, as in the case of a regional production system) are likely to be path-dependent. This observation suggests at once that an evolutionary perspective is well 0suited to capture important elements of the dynamics of the economic landscape (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999). It follows that any attempt to describe the economic landscape in terms of instantaneous adjustment and readjustment to a neoclassical optimum optimorum is intrinsically irrelevant. 7. All of these moments of economic and social reality occur in a world in which geography has not yet been—and cannot yet be—abolished (Leamer and Storper, 2001). The dynamics of accumulation shape geographic space, and equally importantly, geographic space shapes the dynamics of accumulation. This means, too, that capitalism is differentiated at varying levels of spatial resolution, from the local to the global, and that sharp differences occur in forms of life from place to place. Indeed, as globalization now begins to run its course, geographic space becomes more important, not less important, because it presents ever-widening possibilities for finely-grained locational specialization and differentiation. Critical analysis of these possibilities must be one of modern economic geography’s principal concerns. 8. Finally, I want to enter a plea for methodological variety and openness. One corollary of this plea is that economic geographers need to recover the lost skills of quantitative analysis, not out of some atavistic impulse to reinstate the economic geography of the 1960s, but because of the proven value of these skills in the investigation of economic data. The steady erosion of geographers’ capabilities in this regard over the last couple of decades is surely a net loss to the discipline.

#### Our form of colonization is selfless – It seeks to maintain states and solve development

Elshtain, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, ‘03 (Jean Bethke, “Just War Against Terrorism” pg. 166)

Sometimes the most effective new frameworks are old ones resituated in a new reality. That is why some have called for a return of imperialism— not the bad old imperialism that colonized and took all power for governance out of the hands of indigenous peoples, carved up continents with no sense of tribal and naturally occurring borders and boundaries, and left a legacy of bitterness. Rather, the sort of imperialism that commentators like Sebastian Mallaby and Michael Ignatieff are groping toward is an image of the world's great superpower taking on an enormous burden and doing so with a relatively, though not entirely, selfless intent. The imperialism they suggest is not one of colonial states dominated by provincial governors, but rather a form of nation-building that is primarily concerned with a new version of deterrence. What is being deterred or forestalled are failed states, within which hapless citizens are victimized by the ruthless and terrorists are given carte blanche to operate. When states fail, we approach something like the nightmare of Thomas Hobbes's war of all against all.

**Turn American imperialism prevents genocides and wars**

**Boot 3** (senior fellow for the national security studies “U.S. Imperialism: A force for Good” http://www.cfr.org/iraq/us-imperialism-force-good/p5959)JC

What is the greatest danger facing America as it tries to rebuild Iraq: Shiite fundamentalism? Kurdish separatism? Sunni intransigence? Turkish, Syrian, Iranian or Saudi Arabian meddling? All of those are real problems, but none is so severe that it can't readily behandled. More than 125,000 U.S. troops occupy Mesopotamia. They are backed up by the resources of the world's richest economy. In a contest for control of Iraq, America can outspend and outmuscle any competing faction. The greatest danger is that America won't use all of its power for fear of the "I" word -- imperialism. When asked on April 28 on al-Jazeera whether the United States was "empire building," Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld reacted as if he'd been asked whether he wears women's underwear. "We don't seek empires," he replied huffily. "We're not imperialistic. We never have been." That's a fine answer for public consumption. The problem is that it isn't true. The United States has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called the "empire of liberty" expanded across the continent. When U.S. power stretched from "sea to shining sea," the American empire moved abroad, acquiring colonies ranging from Puerto Rico and the Philippines to Hawaii and Alaska. While the formal empire mostly disappeared after the Second World War, the United States set out on another bout of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation." But when Americans are running foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent "nation-building" experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are imperialism under another name. Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice. That doesn't mean looting Iraq of its natural resources; nothing could be more destructive of the goal of building a stable government in Baghdad. It means imposing the rule of law, property rights, free speech and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be. This will require selecting a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and then backing him or her to the hilt. Iran and other neighbouring states won't hesitate to impose their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views.

### Baudrillard

**The aff’s relationship to death is one of up-front recognition and humility. By banishing the specter of death, they just make the sarcophagus invisible, turning confrontation into obsession**

**Dollimore 98**, Sociology – U Sussex,

(Jonathan, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, pg. 221)

Jean Baudrillard presents the argument for the existence of a denial of death in its most extreme form. For him, this denial is not only deeply symptomatic of contemporary reality, but represents an insidious and pervasive form of ideological control. His account depends heavily upon a familiar critique of the Enlightenment's intellectual, cultural and political legacy. This critique has become influential in recent cultural theory, though Baudrillard's version of it is characteristically uncompromising and sweeping, and more reductive than most. The main claim is that Enlightenment rationality is an instrument not of freedom and democratic empowerment but, on the contrary, of repression and violence. Likewise with the Enlightenment's secular emphasis upon a common humanity; for Baudrillard this resulted in what he calls 'the cancer of the Human' - far from being an inclusive category of emancipation, the idea of a universal humanity made possible the demonizing of difference and the repressive privileging of the normal: the 'Human' is from the outset the institution of its structural double, the 'Inhuman\*. This is all it is: the progress of Humanity and Culture are simply the chain of discriminations with which to brand 'Others' with inhumanity, and therefore with nullity, {p. 125) Baudrillard acknowledges here the influence of Michel Foucault, but goes on to identify something more fundamental and determining than anything identified by Foucault: at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death, (p. 12.6) So total is this exclusion that, 'today, it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. To be dead is an unthinkable anomaly; nothing else is as offensive as this. Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy' (p. 126). He insists that the attempt to abolish death (especially through capitalist accumulation), to separate it from life, leads only to a culture permeated by death - 'quite simply, ours is a culture of death' (p. 127). Moreover, it is the repression of death which facilitates 'the repressive socialization of life'; all existing agencies of repression and control take root in the disastrous separation of death from life (p. 130). And, as if that were not enough, our very concept of reality has its origin in the same separation or disjunction (pp. 130-33). Modern culture is contrasted with that of the primitive and the savage, in which, allegedly, life and death were not separated; also with that of the Middle Ages, where, allegedly, there was still a collectivist, 'folkloric and joyous' conception of death. This and many other aspects of the argument are questionable, but perhaps the main objection to Baudrillard's case is his view of culture as a macro-conspiracy conducted by an insidious ideological prime-mover whose agency is always invisibly at work (rather like God). Thus (from just one page), the political economy supposedly ^intends\* to eliminate death through accumulation; and 'our whole culture is just one huge effort to dissociate life and death' {p. 147; my emphases). What those like Baudrillard find interesting about death is not the old conception of it as a pre-cultural constant which diminishes the significance of all cultural achievement, but, on the contrary, its function as a culturally relative - which is to say culturally formative - construct. And, if cultural relativism is on the one hand about relinquishing the comfort of the absolute, for those like Baudrillard it is also about the new strategies of intellectual mastery made possible by the very disappearance of the absolute. Such modern accounts of how death is allegedly denied, of how death is the supreme ideological fix, entail a new intensity and complexity of interpretation and decipherment, a kind of hermeneutics of death. To reinterpret death as a deep effect of ideology, even to the extent of regarding it as the most fundamental ideological adhesive of modern political repression and social control, is simultaneously to denounce it as in some sense a deception or an illusion, and to bring it within the domain of knowledge and analysis as never before. Death, for so long regarded as the ultimate reality - that which disempowers the human and obliterates all human achievement, including the achievements of knowledge - now becomes the object of a hugely empowering knowledge. Like omniscient seers, intellectuals like Baudrillard and Bauman relentlessly anatomize and diagnose the modern (or post-modern) human condition in relation to an ideology of death which becomes the key with which to unlock the secret workings of Western culture in all its insidiousness. Baudrillard in particular applies his theory relentlessly, steamrollering across the cultural significance of the quotidian and the contingent. His is an imperialist, omniscient analytic, a perpetual act of reductive generalization, a self-empowering intellectual performance which proceeds without qualification and without any sense that something might be mysterious or inexplicable. As such it constitutes a kind of interpretative, theoretical violence, an extreme but still representative instance of how the relentless anatomizing and diagnosis of death in the modern world has become a struggle for empowerment through masterful -i.e. reductive - critique. Occasionally one wonders if the advocates of the denial-of-death argument are not themselves in denial. They speak about death endlessly yet indirectly, analysing not death so much as our culture's attitude towards it. To that extent it is not the truth of death but the truth of our culture that they seek. But, even as they make death signify in this indirect way, it is still death that is compelling them to speak. And those like Baudrillard and Bauman speak urgently, performing intellectually a desperate mimicry of the omniscience which death denies. One senses that the entire modern enterprise of relativizing death, of understanding it culturally and socially, may be an attempt to disavow it in the very act of analysing and demystifying it. Ironically then, for all its rejection of the Enlightenment's arrogant belief in the power of rationality, this analysis of death remains indebted to a fundamental Enlightenment aspiration to mastery through knowledge. Nothing could be more 'Enlightenment', in the pejorative sense that Baudrillard describes, than his own almost megalomaniac wish to penetrate the truth of death, and the masterful controlling intellectual subject which that attempt presupposes. And this may be true to an extent for all of us more or less involved in the anthropological or quasi-anthropological accounts of death which assume that, by looking at how a culture handles death, we disclose things about a culture which it does not know about itself. So what has been said of sex in the nineteenth century may also be true of death in the twentieth: it has not been repressed so much as resignified in new, complex and productive ways which then legitimate a never-ending analysis of it. It is questionable whether the denial of death has ever really figured in our culture in the way that Baudrillard and Bauman suggest. Of course, the ways of dealing with and speaking about death have changed hugely, and have in some respects involved something like denial. But **in philosophical and literary terms there has never been a denial of death**.2 Moreover, however understood, the pre-modern period can hardly be said to have been characterized by the 'healthy\* attitude that advocates of the denial argument often claim, imply or assume. In fact it could be said that we can begin to understand the vital role of death in Western culture only when we accept death as profoundly, compellingly and irreducibly traumatic.

**Our aff may contain an element of fear, but that’s not really the point – it’s about embracing freedom – their search for an authentic relationship to mortality recreates the worst kind of solipsism**

**Dollimore 98**, Sociology – U Sussex,

(Jonathan, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, pg. 221)

But freedom cannot embrace death. Despite taking so much from modern philosophers of death like Heidegger and Kojeve, Sartre finally has to eliminate death from the finitude of being. He takes Heideggerian nothingness into self, making it the basis of freedom, but he also privileges selfhood in a way which Heidegger emphatically did not, and resists Heidegger's embrace of death. Sartre knows that to take death so profoundly into being, as did Heidegger and Kojeve, threatens the entire project of human freedom as praxis, which is the most important aspect of Sartre's existentialism. Certainly, for Heidegger, authenticity did not entail praxis, and in his Letter on Humanism' he actually repudiated Sartre's attempt to derive from his work a philosophical rationale for existential engagement; so far as Heidegger was concerned, such engagement was only another version of inauthentic 'social' existence, a social evasion of the truth of Being. But was Heidegger's own truth of Being ever more than a state of authenticity whose main objective is obsessively to know or insist on itself as authentic? For all his talk of freedom, there remains in Heidegger a sense in which authenticity remains a petrified sense of self, paralysed by the very effort of concentrating on the profundity of Being, which always seems to be also a condition of mystical impossibility: 'Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein\* (Being and Time, p. 294). Not so for Sartre. He recognizes the modern project whereby death is Snteriorizcd . . . humanized (and] individualized\*, and that Heidegger gave philosophical form to this process. On the face of it, this is an attractive development, since death as apparent limit on our freedom is reconceptualized as a support of freedom {Being and Nothingness, pp. 532-3). But, against Heidegger, Sartre argues that death, far from being the profound source of being and existential authenticity, is just a contingent fact like birth, and this, far from being a limit, is what guarantees one's freedom. Heidegger's entire account of death rests on an erroneous conflation of death and finitude; finitude is essentially internal to life and the grounds of our freedom - 'the very act of freedom is therefore the assumption and creation of finitude. If I make myself, I make myself finite and hence my life is unique' - whereas death is simply an external and factual limit of my subjectivity (pp. 546-7). Quite simply, 'It is absurd that we are born; it is absurd that we die' (p. 547). This perhaps entails a fear of death, since 'to be dead is to be a prey for the living': one is no longer in charge of one's own life; it is now in the hands of others, of the living (p. 543). It is true that death haunts me at the very heart of each of my human projects, as their inevitable reverse side. But this reverse side of death is just the end of my possibilities and, as such, 'it does not penetrate me. The freedom which is my freedom remains total and infinite . . . Since death is always beyond my subjectivity, there is no place for it in my subjectivity' (pp. 547-8).

**Baudrilllard’s analysis excludes criticism of ideologies and material realities that influence and act as accurate signifiers of future events**

**Kellner and Kellner No Date**

<http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell26.htm>  “Baudrillard: A New McLuhan?”By Douglas KellnerGeorge F. Kneller Philosophy of Education Chair Division of Social Sciences & Comparative EducationGraduate School of Education & Information Studies, UCLA

Another problem is that Baudrillard's formalism vitates the project of ideology critique, and against his claims that media content are irrelevant and unimportant, I would propose grasping the dialectic of form and content in media communication, seeing how media forms constitute content and how content is always formed or structured, while forms themselves can be ideological, as when the situation comedy form of conflict/resolution projects an ideological vision which shows all problems easily capable of being resolved within the existing society, or when action-adventure series formats of violent conflict as the essence of reality project a conservative view of human life as a battleground where only the fittest survive and prosper.[12] For a dialectical theory of the media, television would have multiple functions (and potential decodings) where sometimes the ideological effects may be predominant while at other times time functions a medium like television functions as mere noise or through the merely formal effects which Baudrillard puts at the center of his analysis.  Consequently, there is no real theory or practice of cultural interpretation in Baudrillard's media (increasingly anti-)theory, which also emanates an anti-hermeneutical bias that denies the importance of content and is against interpretation.[13] This brings us to a second subordination in Baudrillard's theory in which a more dialectical position is subordinated to media essentialism and technological determinism. For -- according to Baudrillard -- it is the technology of, say, television that determines its effects (one-way transmission, semiurgy, implosion, extermination of meaning and the social) rather than any particular content or message (i.e. for both Baudrillard and McLuhan "the media is the message"), or its construction or use within specific social systems. For Baudrillard, media technology andsemiurgy are the demiurges of media practices and effects, separated from their uses by specific economic and political interests, individuals and groups, and the social systems within which they function. Baudrillard thus abstracts media from social systems and essentializesmedia technology as dominant social forces. Yet against Baudrillard, one could argue that capital continues to be a primary determinant of media form and content in neo-capitalist societies just as state socialism helps determine the form, nature, and effects of technologies in certain state socialist societies.  Baudrillard, like McLuhan, often makes essentializing distinctions between media like television or film, ascribing a particular essence to one, and an opposed essence to the other. Yet it seems highly problematical to reduce apparatuses as complex, contradictory, and many-sided as television (or film or any mass medium) to its formal properties and effects, or to a technological essence. It is therefore preferable, for theories of media in the capitalist societies, to see the media as syntheses of technology and capital, as technologies which serve specific interests and which have specific political and economic effects (rather than merely technological ones). It is also preferable to see the dialectic between media and society in specific historical conjunctures, to see how social content, trends, and imperatives help constitute the media which in turn influence social developments and help constitute social reality.  For Baudrillard, by contrast, the media today simply constitute a simulated, hyperreal, and obscene (in his technical sense) world(view), and a dialectic of media and society is shortcircuited in a new version of technological determinism. The political implications of this analysis are that constituting alternative media, or alternative uses or forms of existing media, is useless or worse because media in their very essence for him militate against emancipatory politics or any project of social transformation. Such cynical views, however, primarily benefit conservative interests who presently control the media in their own interests -- a point to which I shall soon return.

**Their Criticism Fails – It Inaccurately Describes the World as Post Political**

**Bylund 12**(Jonas, Department of Human Geography, Stockholm University Conference brief and comment on the symposium: Is planning past politics? Political displacements and democratic deficits in contemporary territorial governance, 8–10 September, Royal institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, http://www.urbanalys.se/texts/bylund-2011-postpolitical-pre-print.pdf)kc

Post-politics is a collector, a regime, a condition, and it is coming to your local theatre, it is soon everywhere. All political activity is up for colonisation at the moment, it seems. It will transform all politics – and in effect planning – to a rigged game of sycophancy, so to speak, in that decision making space is made so narrow so as only to allow a minuscule debate in highly restricted discourse. Since there has been a debate after all, it can shamelessly be called democracy by its instigators. Or so the characterisation runs by planning students who use the notion to characterize **contemporary ‘apolitical’ politics**. The notion **is on the verge to becoming a generic shorthand for our understanding of much urban and regionalplanning. The antidote**, as far as I understand the discussions (and cf. Swyngedouw, 2009), is to take care of and nurture the rare and fragile proper political irruptions which are **ascribed** the **potential to destabilise post-politics** (at least for a while).  **Ironically, one can wonder whether the genre of post-political diagnosis is itself at risk of attracting a post-political condition? That is, soon any kind, any action or statement, in or to characterise formal or informal decision-making settings which does not try to – or even succeed in – taking account of any voice, any articulation whatsoever in whatever way, which claims that it has bearing on an issue, will be condemned as acting post-politicly.**It is a matter of ‘discourse 101’: I remember a keynote by David Harvey at the International Conference of Critical Geography in Mexico City, 2005. It was an analysis of neoliberalism and its philosophy. A Harvey keynote. But it was the first of a five days long conference. It became very hard to discuss critical geography without relating it to that particular keynote – or, rather, the particular notion dealt within it. Which of course is the point of a keynote: to set the key in which a conference can ‘jam’. However, there were also sentiments among many scholars of being forced into using ‘neoliberal’ and its derivatives. Many felt – for good or for bad –that there was no escaping that version of the world in whichever particular setting was up for critical inquiry. To the point of self-ridicule, trying not to say the word every other sentence, some participants started using formulations like ‘the NL-word’ instead – even in paper presentations.**In the academe, in research, and perhaps especially in the social sciences, we often see** the same kind of dynamics: **a notion, a concept, signifying a topic in a quite particular way (a framing) seems to colonise (or at least establish trade posts for slave trade) discourse and aspire hegemony**. Many times, if not most, it is possible to kindly acknowledge arguments but still ignore ‘the game’, so to speak. **The post-political vocabulary** may be a bit different, as it draws on not only ‘categorisation’ but a very Modern mechanism of **setting up clearly ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sides of the dualism** (see e.g. Woolgar, 2002, on the critique against conceptual binaries in the social sciences). **Dualities such as these**, according to much STS thought and other ‘post-’thinkers such as Deleuze, **tend to freeze thinking rather than open it up.** In human geography, my main field of academic training, the critique against dualisms many times converge around a statements such as: Binary structures ... establish relations of opposition and exclusion rather than of sameness and interconnection between the two terms involved. Much of human geography, then, has potentially accepted uncritical accounts of power relations simply by endorsing binary thinking. (Cloke and Johnston, 2005, p.12).

**Means The Alt Cant Lead to a New Form of Politics – Only the Permutation Solves**

**Bylund 12**(Jonas, Department of Human Geography, Stockholm University Conference brief and comment on the symposium: Is planning past politics? Political displacements and democratic deficits in contemporary territorial governance, 8–10 September, Royal institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, http://www.urbanalys.se/texts/bylund-2011-postpolitical-pre-print.pdf)kc

Like Bartleby, who unto his master’s command says ‘I prefer not to’ (Melville, 2004; cf. Stengers, 2005), a choice of not using the vocabulary could be one way to enhance the critique? **How do we keep the lesson to be learnt by these accounts without having everything pushed through the dualist post-political/proper political grinder?** **These very effective categories can indeed hinder creative diagnosis with different answers on possible solutions (i.e. both analytical and normative statements).** Otherwise, and here is the ironic twist to these two operators which make up the sorting principle in the post-political correctness: in the worst case**, articulations which prefer not to use the vocabulary of post-politics** and the proper political – the first principles in the grammar package – **will be considered to be noise, not ‘realist’, and thus made irrelevant by a mechanism not dissimilar from that which is the main target of critique in the ‘genre’.** A proper political attitude could very well be to encourage many different languages, vocabularies, practices of making diagnosis and propose possibilities which does not even use the words ‘political’ or ‘politics’? Just as there are ways to make a social analysis without really using ‘the social’ (cf. Latour, 2005b). **So, what is the role for planning when everything is politics but not much of it deemed proper? To at least try, even in the face of post-political correctness? This is perhaps what Eric Swyngedouw meant** – or could mean? – **in the comment on the summation of the first day: ‘dare to fail’, which is also an encouragement of perhaps trying to do something even in the face of being accused of recreating post-politics?**

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### Fiat Double Bind

#### Spectating is an essential form of action – their criticism produces a dangerous hierarchy of activity and passivity

Hallward, 2006 (Peter, Professor of Modern European Philosophy at Middlesex, “Staging Equality: On Rancière’s Theatrocracy,” new left review 37, p. 114-115)

Applied to the theatre, Jacotot’s premise allows Rancière to develop a general account of the ‘emancipation of the spectator.’ Classical theorists of the theatre from Plato to Rousseau considered spectators to be trapped both by their passivity, in contrast to the performer’s activity, and their ignorance, in contrast to the performer’s knowledge of artistry and illusion. The modern response has most often been to explore the potential of a ‘theatre without spectatorship’—a drama purged of passivity and ignorance, either by maximizing the distance between spectacle and spectator (Brecht) or by minimizing it (Artaud). Along the same lines, Debord, after defining spectacle by its externality, was to call for the elimination of all theatrical ‘separation’ or distance. These and comparable responses maintain, however, the basic structure upon which specular inequality depends—the hierarchy of passivity and activity, of ‘incapacity on one side and capacity on the other’. By contrast, theatrical ‘emancipation starts from the opposite principle, the principle of equality. It begins when we dismiss the opposition between looking and acting’, when we realize that looking also is an action which confirms or modifies the distribution of the visible, and that ‘interpreting the world’ is already a means of transforming it, of reconfiguring it. Spectators are active, as are students or scientists: they observe, select, compare, interpret. They relate what they observe with many other things that they have observed, on other stages, in other kinds of spaces. They make their own poems with the poem that is performed in front of them.20 In theatre as much as in politics or art, the distance of the spectacle is essential to its effect. It is because the spectators never wholly identify with what they see, because they draw on their own experiences and retain a critical distance, that they are able actively and knowingly to engage with the spectacle. What they see is never simply what the performers present or intend. Spectators ‘pay attention to the performance to the extent that they are distant.’ Just as educational emancipation does not involve the transformation of ignorance into knowledge, so too the emancipation of spectators does not involve their conversion into actors so much as a recognition that the boundary between actor and spectator is itself elusive. We have to acknowledge that ‘any spectator already is an actor of his or her own story and that the actor also is the spectator of the same kind of story.’ By the same token, Rancière’s account of social emancipation begins when an actor hitherto condemned to an oppressively restricted role—a life defined by exploitation and toil—wrests the privilege of leisure and autonomy typically enjoyed by a spectator—the luxuries of unprofitable time, of ‘idle’ contemplation, of individual or idiosyncratic taste—and thereby changes the general distribution of functions and roles. ‘This is what emancipation means: the blurring of the opposition between they who look and they who act’, between those who are trapped by their function or identity and those who are not.21

### Spanos

#### Aerospace maquilas don’t increase the rich poor gap – provide stable jobs

Guidi 12 – competitive set in the larger media and information landscape consists of organizations focused on creating, partnering and providing global news and cultural perspectives content (Ruxandra, “US Aerospace and Defense Companies Set Up Shop in Mexico”, PRI, 1/6/12, http://pri.org/stories/2012-01-06/us-aerospace-and-defense-companies-set-shop-mexico)//javi

"People's perception about what cross-border manufacturing, what maquiladoras are like, is still based upon what was happening in the 70s and maybe the 1980s," said Kenn Morris, president of Crossborder Group, a San Diego-based market research firm. Morris said the aerospace industry along Mexico's north-western border is nothing like the stereotype of overcrowded, low-skilled factories. "The fact is that a lot of the factories," he said, listing medical devices, aerospace, and electronics, "they're building in such a way these days, and they're managed in such a way, that they can be put anywhere on the planet. But they're coming to Mexico." In the past five to 10 years, more than 50 aerospace and defense companies have started operations in Baja California, according to Mexico's trade ministry. Most of them are American, and they produce everything from electronic components to steel bolts for commercial and military aircraft. These companies employ more than 10,000 high-tech workers, many of them engineers, technicians and software developers. The companies choose this region for its proximity to the US and to western ports catering to Asian markets. But the main reason they come here is simple: the cost of even highly skilled labor is roughly half of what it is in the United States. In San Diego, a senior aerospace engineer makes on average $90,000. In Tijuana, an engineer with similar skills earns $35,000 to $45,000. Cobham, which produces defense systems, made the move to Tijuana in 1997. Inside its factory, workers dressed in royal blue coveralls sit in groups, looking into microscopes, holding tiny tweezers. "Over here we do the tuning and testing of the product," said Javier Urquizo, a plant manager at Cobham. But Urquizo can't tell me exactly what the product is. That's classified information. "So after we finalize the assembly, we need to tweak around some components to get the electrical responses required on the different frequencies," he said. The company has to apply for special licenses from the State Department to build those components here in Mexico – that's to make sure the raw materials and parts and the technology don't get into the wrong hands. Teresa Jesus Rio Ramos, a production supervisor here, said that aerospace and defense companies offer the most stable, best paid jobs of all the Tijuana maquilas. She makes around $1,800 a month. "I think our company is pretty financially stable," she said, "I don't have to worry from month to month whether I'll have a job or not. But that's not true for all maquilas in Tijuana; people get fired and rehired elsewhere all the time."